

# DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

December 10, 1999

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** G. W. Cunningham, Technical Director

**FROM:** T. Dwyer and H. Waugh, Pantex Site Representatives

**SUBJECT:** Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending December 10, 1999

**DNFSB Activity Summary:** H. Waugh was on site Monday-Wednesday, and Friday. T. Dwyer was on site Monday-Thursday, and attending the SMT at DOE-AL on Friday. D. Burnfield and OE R. West were on site all week observing W62 reviews.

**W62 D&I Program:** Preparations for W62 D&I Program start-up continued this week:

Work is proceeding on correcting problems identified in the authorization basis and the flow down of controls, as well as preparing 2 trainers for future demonstrations. [One will be used to verify closure of DOE-AL Readiness Assessment (RA) findings.]

The W62 Nuclear Explosive Safety Study (NESS) worked through last weekend and closed this Friday. Demonstrations concluded on Wednesday, and the remainder of the time was spent in deliberations. The NESS Group identified 8 new recommendations (1 pre-start and 7 post-start) and endorsed 6 previously identified corrective actions (3 pre-start and 3 post-start). The NESS Group performed in an efficient and effective manner. The DOE-AL RA team draft report had 5 pre-start and 8 post-start findings, and 1 finding (concerning a specific HE response issue) that had not yet been categorized, pending the results of the NESS Revalidation. The draft report was provided to AAO for comment. Further Board staff investigation into the details of the W62 "readiness review process" at Pantex has cast increasing doubt on its effectiveness. [Note that, per memorandum dated November 1<sup>st</sup>, DOE-AL has concluded that both DOE-AL and its contractors are consistently implementing the requirements of DOE Order 425.1A.] Readiness was declared prematurely at each step of the process (i.e., MSA, contractor RA, DOE-AL RA), and the results of each step indicated that corrective actions to address the preceding step's findings had been ineffective. Board staff review of the closure packages for the contractor RA revealed that they provided some evidence of correction of the specific deficiencies identified, but did not further investigate or attack generic issues. In many cases, the evidence provided to support closure was incomplete. DOE-AL review of the closure packages appears to have been cursory at best. Board staff review of the linkages between the authorization basis and shop floor documents (e.g., the W62 NEOPs) revealed that a significant number of discrepancies still exist. Although the contractor RA identified significant findings in this area, the DOE RA used only a limited sample set (1 control) to verify the effectiveness of M&H corrective actions.<sup>[III.A]</sup>

**Fire Protection Issues:** This week, the M&H Fire Department continued its investigation into Occurrence Report ALO-AO-MHC-1999-0083: on November 23<sup>rd</sup>, Post Indicator Valve (PIV) 12P79-4 was identified as mispositioned closed, essentially isolating the high pressure fire loop (HPFL) water supply from the center pre-action [sprinkler] system in Building 12-79, the Production Components Warehouse. It appears that this portion of the system was isolated for 4 days. AAO was not notified until December 2<sup>nd</sup>. M&H has indicated that the personnel involved in this event are not the same as those involved in the inadvertent HPFL isolation event of January 7<sup>th</sup>, 1998 [12-98 Cells 1 and 3], which engendered a Type C investigation.<sup>[III.A]</sup>