

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

June 4, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR: G. W. Cunningham, Technical Director

FROM: T. Dwyer and H. Waugh, Pantex Site Representatives

SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending June 4, 1999

DNFSB Activity Summary: H. Waugh was on leave on Tuesday, and on site Wednesday-Friday. T. Dwyer was on site Tuesday-Thursday, and at DOE-AL Friday for the SMT meeting.

AL-R8 Sealed Insert (SI): M&H project management reports that all pre-start findings from the AL-R8 SI Engineering Evaluation (EE) held May 10th-13th were closed on Thursday. The documentation review portion of the Management Self Assessment (MSA) commenced today. The readiness review question raised in last week's letter has not yet been resolved.^[II.B.2.b]

Pit Issues: The Pit Thermal working group began their regular monthly meeting by reviewing the results of the Building 12-116 Thermal Characterization Test. Temperatures have all returned to normal. The fact that the maximum pit temperature rise during the 6-day test was only 5.1 °F is attributed largely to the huge heat sink effect of the concrete building walls. The test report (currently being prepared) will indicate the need for start-up and shut-down procedures for the HVAC equipment, followed by a training program (possibly including vendor/factory training). A new pit thermal test is in the planning stages. It is being proposed that a group of 24 pits (various types) be packaged in AL-R8 SIs, fitted with instrumentation to allow continuous pit surface temperature recording, and stored in Zone 4 for 2 years. The objective of this test is to confirm that the AL-R8 SI container does provide the extra 12-15 °F temperature margin that was observed in several previous tests.^[II.B.1.a]

W56 Dismantlement Program: Dismantlement of another unit began this week, although the program still halts the dismantlement process at a point just before torque would be applied to the troublesome primary-to-secondary joint. Sufficient industrial health data has now been gathered regarding potential asbestos concerns that NEOP controls requiring the PTs to wear respiratory protection during milling operations are being rescinded. However, more data must be gathered before the rest of the radiologically-based personal protective equipment requirements can be eased. LLNL and SNL are currently developing a model and supporting calculations as part of a load path analysis, which will then feed in to a proposed engineering solution to the stuck-joint problem. LLNL and SNL have already provided M&H with a position paper concerning possible thermal reactions during torquing operations, indicating that the situation identified at Y-12 is not applicable at Pantex. [Tuesday, M&H proposed and AAO approved cancellation of Occurrence Report ALO-AO-MHSM-PANTEX-1999-0037.] A copy of this position paper has been obtained for Board staff review.^[II.B.2.a]

W87 Life Extension Program (LEP): M&H has submitted the Hazard Analysis Report (HAR) and Activity Based Controls Document (ABCD) associated with Mechanical Safe and Arming Detonator (MSAD) operations for the W87 to DOE. Assuming the documents are approved as written, M&H expects to reconvene the W87 contractor Readiness Assessment (RA) team the week of June 21st, to review implementation of this new portion of the Authorization Basis. DOE's RA team (or portion thereof) will probably reconvene the week of June 28th.^[II.B.2.a]