

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

April 2, 1999

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** G. W. Cunningham, Technical Director

**FROM:** T. Dwyer and H. Waugh, Pantex Site Representatives

**SUBJECT:** Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending April 2, 1999

**DNFSB Activity Summary:** H. Waugh and T. Dwyer were on site all week.

**W87 Program:** The final report for the M&H readiness review (RR) of the W87 AB was issued Wednesday. It included the findings previously discussed, plus 5 lessons learned. As part of the corrective actions for the findings, M&H developed a proposed change to the W87 ABCD. Preliminary indications are that DOE-AL will only approve part of the change; M&H will then work over the weekend to flow down the revised ABCD controls into appropriate W87 NEOPs, and commence the next LEP unit Monday. The DOE RR will start Tuesday. Meanwhile, M&H is working on corrective actions to deal with the implication of Monday's W87 tester occurrence [see ALO-AO-MHSM-1999-0026, Improper Application of PT-4030 Tester]. Of note, these actions are being treated independently of the preparations for the narrowly scoped DOE RR.

**BIO Upgrade Program:** Tuesday, AAO/M&H conducted the 2<sup>nd</sup> half of their internal BIO Upgrade Program Review, highlighted below. For all of these efforts, funding is a major issue.

- ! The Special Purpose Facilities BIO Upgrade project team expects to deliver the hazard tables and BIO addendum to the W76 Project Team by mid-June.
- ! The Seismic BIO Upgrade effort is now projected to reach completion by March 2000. Current efforts are focused on facility [SQUG] walkdowns. However, these walkdowns are not keyed to occur/re-occur following the major facility upgrades in progress this year.
- ! The Fire Protection BIO Upgrade team is still wrestling with the issue of reactivating the deluge initiation feature of the ultraviolet fire detectors in Zone 12 bays and cells.
- ! The Lightning Protection Project team expects to deliver its final report [requested by Board letter dated September 12, 1997] to AAO by April 17<sup>th</sup>. However, this report will not necessarily satisfy all of the issues raised in either the original Board letter or the March 25, 1999 Board letter on this subject; and the report will specifically note that further work is required regarding the effects of the high mast [security] lights and the effects of a strike to the catenary lightning protection system. M&H also has open questions regarding which administrative control scheme to use for stand-off distances, and SNL resolution of potential vulnerabilities of full-up units transported during lightning warnings.

**Isopropyl Alcohol Fire:** On March 17<sup>th</sup>, M&H submitted a corrective action plan based on the results of the investigation into the cause of the small fire in 12-44 Cell 3 on December 29<sup>th</sup>. Wednesday, AAO formally rejected the plan. In particular, AAO concluded that insufficient emphasis was placed on efforts to remove/replace flammable solvents currently in use in various weapons programs. Also, the corrective action plan did not address requirements for divisions other than Manufacturing, specific actions were not clearly tied to judgements of need in the investigation report, and some of the actions were merely "a plan for a plan."

**AL-R8 Sealed Insert:** DOE-AL has directed AAO to plan DOE QA requirements (e.g., receipt inspection) based on the assumption that the sealed insert will not leave the Pantex site.