

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

April 3, 1998

TO: G.W. Cunningham, Technical Director

FROM: P.F. Gubanc & D.G. Ogg, Hanford Site Representatives

SUBJ: Activity Report for Week Ending April 3, 1998

Board members Conway, Eggenberger, DiNunno and Mansfield were at Hanford this week accompanied by staff members Krahn, Arcaro, Moyle and Wille.

A. Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP): This week, Babcock & Wilcox Hanford Co. (BWHC) completed all remaining pre-start findings for resumption of Phase 1 fissile material handling at PFP (pending Fluor Daniel Hanford (FDH) & DOE-RL verification). BWHC and FDH expect to submit the PFP Restart Plan and the FDH Monitoring Plan, and request re-start authorization from DOE-RL on April 7.

Dr. Jerry McKamy and a team of criticality safety experts reviewed site-level and PFP-specific criticality safety procedures and processes this week. One significant finding prompted an Unusual Occurrence report (issued 4/2/98): the team found that one of the facility's Criticality Safety Evaluation Reports (CSER) did not provide an adequate criticality safety basis for work in a plutonium glovebox. A report of the team's findings is expected to be available by April 10.

B. Meeting with the Public: On April 2, Mr. Ogg attended a public meeting of the Hanford Advisory Board (HAB) and participated in a panel discussion of the Hanford Spent Nuclear Fuel Project (SNFP). The panel also included representatives from DOE-RL, Washington State Departments of Ecology and Health, and the EPA. Mr. Ogg provided an overview of the Board's function, and reiterated concerns raised in DNFSB/TECH-17 and recent Board letters concerning the SNFP.

C. Construction Inspection: The Fluor Daniel Hanford (FDH) Assurance Inspection (A/I) group conducts inspections of construction for the benefit of the government. DOE-RL recently became aware that many of the approved A/I plans do not include inspections that DOE-RL would normally expect to be conducted (e.g., as-built drawing verification). In some cases, project managers have specifically deleted these inspections to reduce project costs (although higher startup costs are usually experienced by the operating contractor as a result). We are pursuing with DOE-RL what remedies they expect to employ to correct this situation.

cc: Board members