

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

June 2, 2000

**TO:** J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director  
**FROM:** D. F. Owen, D. J. Grover, RFETS Site Representatives  
**SUBJECT:** RFETS Activity Report for the Week Ending June 2, 2000

**Building 371 Operations.** Following a ventilation surveillance test a few weeks ago, Building 371 stationary operating engineers placed two inoperable exhaust fans online. About two hours later, the shift configuration control authority (CCA) identified the situation, entered the required Limiting Condition for Operation, had the inoperable fans secured, and had operable fans placed online. This event was not considered a reportable occurrence until a DOE facility representative identified it as a potential Authorization Basis (AB) violation while reviewing the CCA log last week. While some improvement has been evident, this situation provides another example of Building 371 operations personnel not making conservative decisions on the impact of an occurrence on the AB without DOE interaction (see site rep. report of April 28, 2000). (3-A)

**Work Planning and Control.** The Board's letter of April 25, 2000 noted RFETS efforts to improve activity-level work planning as laid out in the recently revised RFETS Integrated Work Control Program (IWCP). Two staff observations forwarded by the Board's letter concerned the need to define the basic work steps of an activity during the Job Hazard Analysis (JHA) process in detail sufficient to identify specific hazards and safety controls, and the need for effective training and mentoring of work planning personnel in implementing the revised IWCP.

Related to the first observation, the JHA for dismantlement and size reduction of two drained, contaminated tanks (Tanks T1 and T2) and one glovebox (FL1) in the Building 776/777 Complex was revised to address a similar issue from a contractor readiness review (see site rep. report of March 24, 2000). The JHA for this activity now defines basic work steps appropriate for identification of hazards and controls. However, some controls for radiological hazards were not clearly defined in the JHA (e.g., only reference to a Radiological Work Permit was provided), contrary to IWCP requirements. Implementation of identified safety controls in the work procedure was improved as well as overall work planning for this activity since the March readiness review. This activity is to start during the week of June 5, 2000.

Regarding the second observation, DOE-RFFO formally requested that Kaiser-Hill provide additional information and specific plans for training work planning personnel on the revised IWCP and for mentoring work planning personnel during activity-level work planning under the IWCP. The site reps. believe the work planning experience discussed above continues to show the need for effective training and mentoring in implementing IWCP requirements. (3-A, 3-B)

**Public Interaction.** The site reps. discussed Plutonium Stabilization and Packaging System (PuSPS) startup issues with a Rocky Flats Coalition of Local Governments representative. The discussions included the inner container contamination control requirements in DOE-STD-3013, and the contamination control measures discussed in the Board's April 25, 2000 letter on PuSPS.  
cc: Board Members