

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

April 14, 2000

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director  
**FROM:** T. Dwyer and H. Waugh, Pantex Site Representatives  
**SUBJECT:** Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending April 14, 2000

**DNFSB Activity Summary:** H. Waugh was on site Monday, and Thursday-Friday; and on leave Tuesday-Wednesday. T. Dwyer was on site Monday-Thursday, and on leave Friday.

**Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS) Verification Relook:** The DOE team evaluating the ISMS description, and the implementing manuals and codes of practice for the Pantex Plant, completed their planned 2-week relook. At an outbrief on Thursday, the team cited 33 specific issues, broken down into 5 opportunities for improvement (OFIs). M&H is responsible for 3 of these OFIs, DOE-AL/AAO for 1, and a joint DOE/contractor effort will be required for the other 1. The ISMSV relook team will recommend that the ISMS description be approved after M&H corrects deficiencies in the scope [areas of incomplete coverage, OFI #1], and after M&H submits an adequate corrective action plan to address specific shortfalls in clarity [OFI #3]. Internal inconsistencies in the ISMS description on the part of M&H [OFI #2] and AAO [OFI #5] are expected to be addressed prior to convening the ISMSV Phase II team, which remains scheduled for June 19<sup>th</sup> - 30<sup>th</sup>. OFI #4 will probably require DOE-AL to lead closure efforts, as it involves further defining and strengthening formal mechanisms to integrate Design Agency support of Pantex operations. Overall, the relook team found significant improvement since the initial [September 1998] review. A draft report will be made available for factual accuracy review by this evening; the final report is scheduled for issue next Friday.<sup>[III.A]</sup>

**Pit Issues:** Over the weekend, M&H completed the repackaging queue in the original Building 12-64 AL-R8 SI facility and cleared all special nuclear material, so that vacuum systems upgrades could begin early Monday. The upgrades were completed Thursday, well ahead of schedule, and by Friday M&H had restored 2-line, 2-shift operations. Overall throughput this week was 23, for a total of 597. In contrast to this positive news, it was revealed this week that Building 12-99 Bay 4 was allowed to undergo a gradual rise in temperature [~15°F] between March 24<sup>th</sup> and April 3<sup>rd</sup>. During that time, several pits were being staged in the facility -- including 2 temperature-sensitive pits [for a portion of the temperature-rise interval].<sup>[III.A]</sup>

**Lightning Issues:** AAO completed their review of the Lightning BIO, submitted by M&H last week, and forwarded a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) to DOE-AL recommending approval of the BIO on Wednesday. DOE-AL concurrence is required under the terms of the delegation of AB authority to AAO, because 2 layers of engineered control cannot be achieved for all lightning IND scenarios. The BIO approval letter was issued on Friday.<sup>[III.A]</sup>

**W76 D&I Program:** The contractor Readiness Assessment for the W76 D&I Program, the 1<sup>st</sup> enduring stockpile SS-21 effort, was officially suspended on Monday. Although significant findings had been identified in several support facilities and support organizations, the direct cause of the suspension was LANL's withdrawal of their "acceptable" Qualification Engineering Release (QER) and issuance of an "unacceptable" QER. LANL has determined that the current design of the Mid Cap Disassembly Fixture poses an unanalyzed hazard, and is requiring that it be redesigned. Subsequently, SNL has also decided to withdraw their QER and issue an "unacceptable" QER. Apparently, with the program already halted, SNL has decided to advance 3 electrical/lightning-related issues [1 of which SNL and the Project Team already suspected was going to be issues during the NESS]. It is not clear why these LANL/SNL issues, which have apparently been known for some time, were not dealt with prior to declaring readiness, and, of equal concern, were not disclosed in advance to the contractor Readiness Assessment team.<sup>[III.A]</sup>