

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

September 15, 2000

**TO:** J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director

**FROM:** Paul F. Gubanc and David T. Moyle, Oak Ridge Site Representatives

**SUBJ:** Activity Report for Week Ending September 15, 2000

Outside expert Ralph West was at Y-12 to observe contractor reviews for a dismantlement campaign.

A. Y-12 Dismantlement: The Management Self-Assessment (MSA) of the upcoming dismantlement campaign continued. Completion of the MSA was delayed by the need to revise the dismantlement procedure for the second time since starting the MSA because of issues raised by the MSA team and Board staff. This week the MSA team completed observations and record reviews while noting that operations indicated the need for another major revision to the procedure. The MSA team has been thorough and has raised many of the same issues as the Board staff, e.g., inadequate procedure verification, incomplete flowdown of safety controls, inadequate implementation of radiological controls, and deficient fire protection posture of the facility. The contractor Readiness Assessment (RA) is now estimated to start late next week at the earliest.

The staff has continued discussions with DOE about the lack of a DOE RA for this new dismantlement process. The DOE Y-12 Site Manager has requested a newly reported senior advisor to reevaluate the issue and make a recommendation. A decision is expected next week. (2-A)

B. Y-12 Maintenance: As reported previously, the recent Y-12 ISMS verification identified significant concerns with the implementation of ISM processes in the maintenance arena. On August 29, 2000, LMES implemented compensatory measures to conduct maintenance and operations management reviews of all new and existing maintenance work packages. As of September 14, over 250 work packages have been reviewed. Based on our inquiries, maintenance work in the nuclear facilities has substantially slowed due to a lack of cleared packages. While detailed statistics are not yet available, the major problems observed include:

- Lessons-learned are not being researched and incorporated (this may include both computer proficiency and records retrieval issues).
- Required review and approval signatures are missing.
- Job hazard identification and analysis are generating non-specific or imprecise controls (e.g., the identified control for some industrial hazards is often listed as "exercise caution"). (1-C)

C. Y-12 Hydrogen Fluoride Supply System (HFSS): A formal Hazard Evaluation lead by an individual from EQE International, Inc. will be conducted for the HFSS beginning next week. The main purpose of this evaluation is to identify all the possible accident scenarios. Later evaluations will determine the need for, and adequacy of, safety controls. (2-A)

D. Y-12 Enriched Uranium Operations (EUO) - Reduction: EUO appears to be making progress in formulating the technical and safety bases for the reduction operations, though very little is in final form. The Basis for Interim Operation (BIO) is being revised to include more detailed descriptions of possible vessel failure scenarios, as well as credited controls to reduce accident frequencies. Proposed controls include a moisture content limit, a furnace high temperature cut-off, and independent operator verification of process steps important to safety. (2-A)

cc: Board Members