

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

March 30, 2001

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director

**FROM:** H. Waugh and W. White, Pantex Site Representatives

**SUBJECT:** Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending March 30, 2001

**DNFSB Activity Summary:** H. Waugh was on site all week. W. White was on site Monday and Tuesday, and on annual leave Wednesday through Friday.

**Work Planning:** There have been three occurrences at Pantex over the past month which appear to demonstrate inadequate work planning for hazardous activities. The occurrences include the separation testing incident discussed in a previous report as well as occurrences involving inadequate controls for beryllium work and a fire during installation of a chiller pump. All of the occurrences involved work activities that were not adequately controlled from an industrial safety perspective. In the separation testing incident, Lockheed Martin procedures were used without adequate industrial safety review from either Lockheed Martin or BWXT. A USQ Evaluation was performed on the Lockheed Martin procedure, but it was determined to be negative because the work did not involve explosives or nuclear material. In the occurrence involving beryllium work, personnel did not implement controls required by the Industrial Hygiene Department for beryllium work; in this case, it was noted that crafts' work packages do not normally go through the work control process, which might have provided for an adequate industrial safety review. For the installation and pre-operational testing of the chiller pump, no BWXT safety work permit was completed since the work was being done by a subcontractor.

Corrective actions for these occurrences are not yet finalized, and it remains to be seen whether the corrective actions will address just these occurrences or will involve broader enhancements to the work planning process. At a minimum, adequate corrective actions would address the apparent holes in the work planning process related to non-nuclear hazardous work in nuclear facilities, work done by crafts, and work done by subcontractors. <sup>[II.A]</sup>

**Material Limits Exceeded:** On Saturday, March 24, BWXT exceeded TSR inventory limits for nuclear material in 12-64, Bay 7. A move of material from Bay 6 was completed without the required telephone call to the Nuclear Materials Control Center (NMCC). When a phone call was made to the NMCC after the move, the NMCC noted the overload situation and restricted further movements. The excess inventory was immediately removed from the bay. During the critique of the occurrence it was also noted that the inventory limits placard in Bay 7 did not match the inventory in the NMCC system. The NMCC inventory was correct.

BWXT management took immediate action to identify and implement appropriate corrective actions when notified of the occurrence. The BWXT general manager required the critique to be held on Sunday, instead of waiting to Monday, and appropriate personnel were recalled to the plant. On Sunday, a standing order was issued by the operations division manager to implement additional controls for material movements, including the establishment of a 'primary mover' who is responsible for ensuring required controls for nuclear materials movement are implemented. <sup>[II.A]</sup>

**Pit Repackaging:** For the month of March, over 170 pits were repackaged. This represents a new monthly record for pit repackaging at Pantex. <sup>[II.A]</sup>