

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

February 16, 2001

**TO:** J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director  
**FROM:** Paul F. Gubanc and David T. Moyle, Oak Ridge Site Representatives  
**SUBJ:** Activity Report for Week Ending February 16, 2001

Staff members Andrews, Bamdad, Coones, Deplitch, Helfrich, and Kupferer visited to review the integration of hazards assessments across Y-12. Mr. Gubanc was out sick Wednesday and Thursday.

A. Y-12 Integrated Hazards: The staff has been conducting a series of reviews across the DOE complex of integration of hazards assessments (e.g., safety analyses, fire hazards analyses [FHA], emergency management hazards assessments, and NEPA analyses). The staff was pleased with the status of Y-12 emergency management hazards assessments, and the use of a single hazard identification procedure by both safety basis and emergency management personnel. However, the staff is concerned about the lack of integration of hazards between NNSA facilities and environmental management/ORNL facilities located at Y-12. The staff is also troubled by the inconsistencies between the current facilities authorization bases and the draft site-wide EIS.

The staff expressed concern about a depleted uranium warehouse that is susceptible to fire. The FHA recognizes an urgent need for lightning protection and electrical upgrades to reduce the potential for fire initiators. The staff also questioned whether sprinklers would be effective for a roof fire. The facility safety basis does not credit any controls to prevent or mitigate a fire because a worst case fire does not exceed offsite radiological dose guidelines. However, the toxic effects of uranium may exceed guidelines. BWXT and the Y-12 Area Office (YAO) recognize that this storage configuration is undesirable, but have not raised it as a priority for correction. Significant risk reduction benefit could be derived by relocating this material to other existing on-site storage space. (1-C)

B. Y-12 Training and Qualification: Last week, we reported that some Y-12 fissile material handlers (FMH) are only qualified, but not certified, contrary to the requirements of DOE Order 5480.20A.

1. BWXT has identified 15 FMH positions that require only qualification, not certification. BWXT and YAO representatives are reevaluating each of these positions for certification.
2. On Monday, YAO formally communicated this issue to BWXT and requested corrective action in 30 days or less. However, on Friday, the YAO Manager verbally requested BWXT senior management to expeditiously provide its justification and compensatory measures for continuing operations with non-certified FMH's. A BWXT reply is expected on February 21<sup>st</sup>.

We are continuing to follow this issue and press for its timely resolution. (1-C)

C. EUO Reduction: The EUO Manager decided this week, after consulting with his operating staff, that he would defer the management self-assessment (MSA) for reduction several days rather than entering it not fully prepared. This is a noted departure from past practice where line managers prematurely started their MSAs due to schedule pressures. We support this decision. (2-A)

D. Y-12 Emergency Drill: Mr. Moyle observed an emergency drill on Wednesday, involving a postulated explosion, fire, material release and personnel injury. The critique was refreshingly candid and identified several issues which need improvement. BWXT continues to make preparations for Y-12's full participation exercise planned for May 9, 2001. (1-C)

cc: Board Members