

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

November 2, 2001

TO: K. Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: D. Grover and M. Sautman, Hanford Site Representatives
SUBJ: Activity Report for the Week Ending November 2, 2001

Mr. Sautman was on leave this week.

T-Plant: The DOE Richland (RL) Operational Readiness Review (ORR) for T-Plant Shippingport spent fuel removal and increase from a Hazard Category 3 to a Hazard Category 2 Facility was terminated this week. This resulted from major findings involving the procedural deficiencies discussed in last week's Hanford activity report, premature declaration of readiness, inadequacy of the contractor ORR, and problems with the corrective action management process. The scope of issues identified by the DOE ORR team have raised questions with the adequacy of the implementation of Integrated Safety Management at T-Plant.

Following the issuance of the DOE ORR final report, DOE-RL line management plans to conduct a critique of the line management verification of contractor readiness to determine why the ORR team findings were not identified by their processes. Once the critique is completed a lessons learned is expected to be issued. The Fluor Hanford will also be required to correct the findings identified before a second attempt to declare readiness. The contractor has not yet notified DOE-RL whether a second contractor ORR will be performed prior to the initiation of a second DOE ORR. (III-A)

Plutonium Finishing Plant: The Fluor Hanford Operational Readiness Review (ORR) for the new thermal stabilization/bagless transfer system glovebox line concluded Friday. The contractor ORR team concluded that following satisfactory closure of the prestart findings and the manageable list of prestart items the facility is prepared to safely package plutonium to meet the 3013 standard. However, the team also determined that the facility prematurely declared readiness. This determination was made in part because of the supervisor qualification and laboratory technician proficiency as regards the thermogravimetric analysis equipment used to verify moisture content of plutonium oxides. The failure to conduct a start to finish integrated demonstration for the line management or management self assessment and inadequacies in the operating procedures also contributed to this declaration. Prestart findings were also identified with a FSAR fire analysis not bounding operational conditions, radiological technical bases that had not been updated for the new operations, and insufficient documentation of the criticality alarm system coverage for the system.

While the extent of items contributing to the premature declaration of readiness at PFP was not as egregious as T-Plant's, These recent ORRs demonstrate that Fluor Hanford has not corrected the failure of the management self assessment process to correctly determine readiness and line management's use of the ORR process to prepare for readiness which was identified during previous PFP and the SNFP ORRs. (III-A)

cc: Board Members