

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

August 9, 2002

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director  
J. J. McConnell, Deputy Technical Director  
**FROM:** R. T. Davis/ T. D. Burns  
**SUBJECT:** SRS Report for Week Ending August 9, 2002

**Recommendation 2000-2:** Last week, WSRC provided a summary report of Recommendation 2000-2 activities at SRS and noted that all Implementation Plan commitments for SRS are complete. The report concludes that SRS vital safety systems are reliable and that site programs will ensure these systems continue to perform their safety functions. Phase I assessments were performed for 229 vital safety systems. During the Phase I reviews, areas of the baseline reconstruction program (e.g., accurate engineering drawings and system/facility design descriptions) were identified as needing improvement.

The SRS Phase II program included five program elements to assess vital safety systems, institutionalize the process and ensure adequate feedback. The five elements included specific Phase II system assessments, other system assessments, incorporation of the Phase II criteria into enduring site assessments (e.g., self assessments and the facility evaluation board), system engineering program, and environmental, safety and health assessments. WSRC has completed these five program elements including specific Phase II assessments of some H-Canyon/F-Canyon vital safety systems and the H-Area fire water supply system.

**Locomotive Derailment:** In late July, a diesel locomotive in K-Area derailed while pushing an empty cask car. No personnel injuries occurred and both the cask car and the locomotive remained upright following the derailment. Subsequent inspection identified that a switch rail point was broken, which appears to be the direct cause of the derailment. WSRC analysis indicates that the rail point failed due to high stress at an existing crack. Following this event, 140 rail points were examined and 20 were replaced. The switch involved in the derailment was inspected in May 2002 with no issues identified.

There are no DOE requirements or site Standards/Requirements Identification Document (S/RID) requirements for track inspections. However, WSRC uses the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) requirements as a guide for site practices. Two years ago, WSRC stopped using a commercial contractor for track inspections and began performing inspections with site personnel. No formal training or procedures are used for these inspections. In addition, the frequency and content of these inspections is not consistent with FRA requirements in some cases. As a part of the corrective actions, WSRC is expected to formalize the track inspection program. EM-1 has requested DOE-SR to conduct an investigation of this event and submit a corrective action plan by August 25, 2002.

**H-Canyon:** During the H-Canyon October 2002 outage, WSRC will transition the Low Activity Waste (LAW) control and monitoring to the Distributed Control System (DCS). This modification will improve LAW system efficiency and is required to support HEU Blend Down activities. During the transition, several safety related indications (e.g., tank levels) will not be available in the control room. WSRC is developing alternate means for operators to monitor required parameters. Procedures and equipment will be tested prior to the outage.