

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

July 12, 2002

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director  
J. J. McConnell, Deputy Technical Director  
**FROM:** R. T. Davis/ T. D. Burns  
**SUBJECT:** SRS Report for Week Ending July 12, 2002

**Clean-up Reform Initiative:** Mr. Paul Golan, Chief Operating Officer for the DOE-HQ Environmental Management (EM) program, was on-site Tuesday for a final review of the draft SRS Performance Management Plan. This plan outlines the sites' clean-up acceleration vision (site rep weekly 5/03/02) and is required to be submitted to OMB by August 1, 2002.

On Friday, DOE-HQ announced that SRS will receive \$216 M from the EM clean-up reform account in FY03. This funding level is approximately half of the \$387M originally requested by the site in the draft Performance Management Plan.

**Low-Curie Salt:** Installation of the submersible pump into the salt-well in Tank 41 was scheduled to begin this week. Equipment problems have postponed installation until next Monday. Once the submersible pump is ready, WSRC plans to drain the tank of interstitial supernate for 45 days to achieve the necessary cesium removal. The schedule for dissolution of the drained low-curie salt-cake and subsequent processing to grout now depends on the availability of the Saltstone Production Facility (SPF).

Recovery efforts from the latest process upset at the SPF (site rep weekly 6/14/02) are nearing completion. The contractor vulnerability assessment continued this week relative to the processing of low-curie salt solution through the SPF. DOE is reviewing this effort to validate the contractors' conclusions and recommendations. BNFL expects to have the facility ready to process remaining inventory of ETF bottoms currently in Tank 50 by the end of the month. All facility modifications recommended by the vulnerability assessment team are expected to be completed prior to the introduction of low-curie salt solution into the SPF.

**H-Canyon Criticality Scenario:** H-Canyon solvent extraction cycles remain shutdown while WSRC resolves the criticality issue identified several weeks ago (site rep weekly 6/21/02). This week, WSRC declared an Unreviewed Safety Question because controls were not implemented for this scenario for first cycle operations, thereby increasing the frequency of a criticality event in the facility. WSRC is developing the Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation and associated criticality controls. H-Canyon solvent extraction operations are expected to resume the week of July 22<sup>nd</sup>.

**HLW Operations:** In response to the recent loss-of-phase electrical event in H-Tank Farm-East, WSRC issued a report this week documenting the causes of the event and outlining recommended corrective actions (site rep weekly 6/21/02). It was concluded that much of the equipment damage was due to a lack of electrical over-load protection for some motors in the tank farms. WSRC is pursuing a path forward to implement the necessary modifications to provide all motors with adequate over-load protection. Additional measures to protect other equipment from loss-of-phase events will only be provided on a case-by-case basis.