

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

April 3, 2009

TO: T. J. Dwyer, Technical Director
FROM: M. P. Duncan and M. T. Sautman, Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Savannah River Site Weekly Report for Week Ending April 3, 2009

D. Eyler, W. Horton, T. Hunt, H. Massie, E. Rozek, and outside expert L. Miller were at SRS this week. Separate reviews included the conduct of operations at the Tritium Facilities, the Salt Waste Processing Facility, the Plutonium Preparation Project, and the ongoing Pit Disassembly and Conversion alternative study.

Procedures: One of the SRNS transformation initiatives is to simplify policies, procedures, and committees across SRS. Two laudable goals include 1) standardizing the site-wide format for procedures, forms, and training of procedure writers and 2) consolidating procedures into a single, electronic location and a single procedure system. SRNS is also planning to eliminate 20% of the procedures across the site and is aggressively identifying anything that is not mandated by their contract, required by an authorization basis, or determined to be mission essential. While SRS has a mature process for evaluating the impacts of new procedures or adding requirements, the process and criteria for evaluating the potential impacts of eliminating procedures is not as well defined. In addition, at the Site Policy and Procedure Council meeting that was observed, there was a lack of participation and feedback by functional subject matter experts and program managers. Furthermore, council members were being asked to agree that policies were redundant without being provided sufficient information to ensure that the requirements were already captured elsewhere or would be incorporated prior to cancellation. The Linking Document Database and use of Standards/Requirements Identification Documents should prevent safety basis and DOE directive requirements from being inadvertently deleted. However, it is not clear if there is a rigorous process to prevent the accidental deletion of procedure requirements that were implemented as part of corrective actions resulting from occurrence reports, external assessments, and lessons learned. The above observations were shared with SRNS senior management.

Integrated Safety Management System: The staff has observed three weeks of interviews, facility observations, and meetings by the ISMS Phase II Verification Review team. The Site Rep met with the team leads because it was not apparent at times that the team was spending as much time reviewing the quality of the products (e.g., hazards analyses, work packages, resolution of post-job feedback) as they were reviewing the processes. Once the team has developed their findings and conclusions, the Site Rep will be meeting with the team leads to get a better understanding of the data supporting them.

K-Area: An extent of condition review identified two items that met safety basis requirements when they were authorized to be received, but whose dose potentials are not currently bounded. The Technical Safety Requirement only requires that shipping packages be authorized rather than directly limiting the dose potential, which is the real concern.

F-Canyon: Following the second failed monthly diesel generator load test in 2009, a task team was formed to review diesel generator issues across SRS to identify potential improvements.

Liquid Waste: Savannah River Remediation, LLC began their contract transition. The repaired Tank 19 sand mantis resumed operations and more than 40% of the tank floor has been cleared of bulk solids.