

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

July 3, 2002

TO: J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: D. F. Owen, RFETS Site Representative
SUBJECT: RFETS Activity Report for the Week Ending July 5, 2002

The site rep. will be out of the office on Thursday and Friday.

Building 371/374 Authorization Basis. This week Kaiser-Hill submitted to DOE-RFFO a new Building 371/374 Decommissioning Basis for Interim Operation (DBIO). This new authorization basis document was submitted to account for the increasing decommissioning work in most areas of these buildings along with the reduced plutonium processing and storage operations planned over the course of the next year. DOE-RFFO is reviewing the proposed DBIO.

Building 371 Decommissioning - Followup. As noted last week, during a task to replace a vacuum hose line between the tank and the receptacle drum as part of a tank raschig ring removal activity, a puff of material resulting in high airborne contamination (52,000 Derived Air Concentration) was observed upon removal of the hose from the slip-fit connection to the receptacle drum. A DOE-RFFO Building 371 Facility Representative (FR) had been reviewing the work planning for this activity and informed the site rep. of the issues that were raised with Building 371 management following their fact-finding on this event. He noted that the work instructions and Job Hazard Analysis (JHA) did not clearly cover this hose replacement task and did not integrate/incorporate controls identified from a separate radiological evaluation. In response, Building 371 is revising the work instructions and JHA to clearly address this task and incorporate controls from the radiological evaluation.

Cause Determination. A staff observation forwarded by the Board's letter of March 19, 2002 addressed deficiencies with proper determination of causes/contributing causes of occurrences. Some improvements have been noted since March. DOE-FRs, however, have recently raised the work planning issues discussed above and lack of use of a safety system status change procedure regarding a Building 371 ventilation system upset (see the June 28th site rep. report). These interactions indicate that Kaiser-Hill fact-finding is continuing to miss important facts that would lead to identifying contributing causes to occurrences.

The site rep. discussed this issue with DOE-RFFO and Kaiser-Hill management. Actions responding to this issue as raised by the Board's March 19th letter are in progress. Kaiser-Hill management has recently emphasized to all RFETS project management the need of fact-finding to determine not only what happened but what was required to happen (by procedures, hazard analyses, manuals, etc.) to support determination of cause(s) and corrective actions. Training and case-studies illustrating this concept are under development. (3-B)

cc

Board Members