

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

May 23, 2002

TO: J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: D. F. Owen, RFETS Site Representative
SUBJECT: RFETS Activity Report for the Week Ending May 24, 2002

The site rep. will be out of the office on Friday.

Planned Size Reduction Activity. Last week, DOE Headquarters made a decision to not use the DT-22 shipping container that had been planned for shipping 125 items containing special nuclear material to Savannah River Site and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. DOE-RFFO has asked Kaiser-Hill to begin planning and preparations to accommodate use of an alternate (smaller) shipping container (the 9975) for these items. The site's plans are to perform size reduction operations on these items in Building 371. Kaiser-Hill plans to perform compaction and shearing operations on most of the items and a direct cutting operation on a small fraction of the items to provide the needed size reduction. Kaiser-Hill intends to complete preparations (equipment set-up, procedures, training, readiness review, etc.) for this activity by October.

Conduct of Operations. There were two occurrences being reported on Thursday in Buildings 707 and 371 where operations personnel failed to notify on-duty shift management of non-compliant or deficient conditions as required:

- Following disassembly of a lathe in Building 707, the work crew discovered that they overloaded a transuranic waste drum (1083 lbs versus the 800 lbs limit). The crew had surmised that the lathe head block loaded in the drum must have weighed much more than what they had assumed in loading the drum (about 850 lbs versus about 400 lbs assumed). The crew had not, however, contacted on-duty shift management to inform them of the overloaded drum. The DOE-RFFO Facility Representative for Building 707 learned of this overloaded condition during a Building walkthrough and discussions with the crew. His inquiry on this issue with shift management and with Building 707 Project management led to the discovery that the crew could have also overloaded lathe glovebox hoists (rated at 500 lbs.) used to move the lathe head block to the drum loading area. This evaluation also led to identification of other issues related to work planning for activities using such hoists (i.e., proper incorporation of site hoisting/rigging requirements into the work instructions and crew training on such requirements).

- Building 371 surveillance personnel had performed a baseline surveillance of the condition of fire protection sprinkler systems. This surveillance was done as a corrective action to the recent Recommendation 2000-2 Phase II assessment of the Building 371 fire protection system (see site rep. reports of February 22nd, March 1st and April 19th) which called into question the adequacy of prior surveillances. Several sprinkler heads were discovered to have deficiencies during the course (a few weeks) of the surveillance, however, the personnel did not immediately report the deficiencies to the on-duty shift manager as required by the surveillance procedure.

Corrective actions regarding proper on-duty shift management notification in both projects are in development. (1-C)