

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

May 10, 2002

**TO:** J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director  
**FROM:** D. F. Owen, RFETS Site Representative  
**SUBJECT:** RFETS Activity Report for the Week Ending May 10, 2002

The site rep. was out of the office Tuesday and Wednesday to attend the Integrated Safety Management Forum sponsored by DOE Headquarters in Albuquerque, New Mexico.

**Conduct of Operations/Work Planning.** As reported last week, there were two events in Building 776 where safety controls were not being implemented resulting in a finger laceration and high airborne levels, respectively. Corrective actions were being developed by Buildings 776/707 project management. This week, the site rep. and staff discussed the events and corrective actions with DOE-RFFO and Buildings 776/707 project management. Some notable aspects on these events include:

- The finger laceration occurred when the injured worker was assisting another worker performing the cut and received the laceration when the saw blade went beyond the cutting area following the cut. The assistance being provided was to hold a plate out of the way of the cut with a crowbar. In addition to not wearing cut resistant gloves as required, this event could have been avoided with proper work planning (i.e., through use of clamps or other restraints to hold the plate).
- In the high airborne event, the work crew was using an alternative pipe cutting method with a saw after the planned "score and snap" method was unsuccessful. The work crew did not stop and report the unsuccessful attempt nor obtain a verification check of the bagged containment by radiological controls personnel as required. Kaiser-Hill also determined that the general allowance in the work instructions to use alternative cutting methods was not backed up with proper analysis during work planning.
- In the use of "standard work packages," the scope has often included a large variety of systems and components to be mechanically disassembled, but without clear, specific hazard analysis and work instructions for the various systems/components. This has contributed to these and other events during the past several months (April 19, March 28, and August 31 site rep. reports).

As a result of these and other events with similar problems, Buildings 776/707 project management is taking the following actions:

- Discontinue generation of new standard mechanical work packages for work other than that which is repetitive in nature and develop new work packages with specific (and reduced) scope, hazard analysis and work instructions.
- Revise work packages in use to address work planning deficiencies (April 19<sup>th</sup> site rep report).
- Continue and expand the conduct of operations monitoring effort (April 5<sup>th</sup> site rep. report).
- Implement use of the Technical Response Team as in Buildings 771 and 371. This team is a multi-disciplined team to provide work crews with quick assistance upon emerging work control issues, questions or unusual/unexpected conditions (August 3, 2001 site rep. report).

The site rep. and staff will continue to follow RFETS actions on these issues. (1-C)