

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

April 26, 2002

TO: J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: D. F. Owen, RFETS Site Representative
SUBJECT: RFETS Activity Report for the Week Ending April 26, 2002

On Wednesday and Thursday, the site rep. attended a safety analysis workshop near RFETS sponsored by the DOE Office of Environmental Management (EM).

Plutonium Stabilization and Packaging System (PuSPS). Building 371 management has identified a negative trend in conduct of operations for PuSPS during the course of the last few weeks. Noted in this negative trend were operator errors in stabilization furnace programming and manual operation of the packaging system as well as failure to provide required notifications to shift management for various problems. This week, Building 371 management implemented a one day pause in operations to re-emphasize conduct of operations requirements to PuSPS personnel. Building 371 management also put in place a senior supervisory watch and has required that the procedures be followed using the 2-person reader/performer method.

Recommendation 2000-2. As reported last week, a glovebox ventilation system upset in Building 559 was due to incorrect engineering input for a task to replace certain solenoids. In opening an electrical breaker to support the task, power was unintentionally cut to differential pressure instrumentation and the system automatically reset to a minimum ventilation exhaust mode. In response to a site rep. inquiry, Kaiser-Hill personnel had stated that the engineer involved in the work planning for the task was not the designated system engineer for this ventilation system per a list developed in response to Recommendation 2000-2.

Following the site rep. inquiry, DOE-RFFO asked Kaiser-Hill to review the implementation and use of the designated system engineer concept at RFETS. It was determined that the designated system engineer list was readily available to management in the various RFETS Projects. Expectations for use of the designated system engineers as well as requirements and guidance for implementation, however, were not well-defined nor consistently understood at multiple levels of Kaiser-Hill management. As a result, Kaiser-Hill is taking action to address these issues including revisions to site policy, engineering and work planning manuals, and training. In discussions with the site rep., DOE and Kaiser-Hill personnel indicated that they would consider the Secretary of Energy's February 2001 guidance on systems engineers in developing these revisions. (1-C)

DOE-EM Workshop. Representatives from several EM sites and DOE Headquarters attended the workshop. The workshop was focused on approaches for development of safety analyses/controls required under DOE Rule 10CFR830, *Nuclear Safety Management*, for EM facilities in various stages of decommissioning. The workshop participants also developed a proposal for DOE-EM management regarding treatment of "inactive waste sites" under 10CFR830. (1-C)