

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

September 13, 2002

TO: J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: Matt Forsbacka, Oak Ridge Site Representative
SUBJ: Activity Report for Week Ending September 13, 2002

A. BWXT Y-12 Enriched Uranium Operations (EUO) Wet Chemistry Restart: This week, BWXT Y-12 management suspended the BWXT Y-12 Operational Readiness Review (ORR) of Enriched Uranium Wet Chemistry Operations. BWXT Y-12 ORR activities were suspended prior to formal issuance of the final report that was expected on Monday. Citing weaknesses in procedure content and evaluation, BWXT Y-12 management indicated that time is needed to complete the procedure review now in progress (see last week's report). Upon completion of this review, which requires two fully successful demonstrations of procedure performance for each of the 48 procedures, the BWXT Y-12 ORR will resume. The scope of the ORR, when restarted, has not yet been defined. (2-A)

B. BWXT Y-12 EUO Fire Protection: This week work commenced to refurbish the C-1 Wing sprinkler system (see weekly report for August 23). Replacement of some of the sprinkler heads in difficult to access locations and problems with replacing a valve have contributed to delays in the accomplishment of this task. Work is anticipated to continue through the weekend. (2-A)

C. Integrated Safety Management (ISM): This week an NNSA ISM verification team from NNSA Headquarters started the annual verification of the YSO ISM system. YSO management has asked the verification team to include in-depth reviews of authorization basis review and program management functions as part of the ISM verification. The verification is expected to be completed next week.

On Thursday, the Site Representative met with ORO and Bechtel Jacobs Company (BJC) personnel to discuss the status of ISM corrective actions. BJC had chartered an independent external evaluation (see weekly report for August 9, 2002) which validated the effectiveness of the ISM corrective action plan in preparing for the DOE ISM system reverification. A key area requiring improvement is the nuclear training and qualifications program. BJC personnel indicated that they are aggressively addressing this weakness. ISM system verification of BJC by DOE/EM is expected to start in-mid January, 2003. In addition, the imminent restructuring of ORO poses some risk on the timely follow through for ORO ISM corrective actions. (1-C)

D. Recommendation 97-1: Last Friday, Oak Ridge National Laboratory Building 3019 personnel discovered, through a data review committee examination of material records, that gram quantities of plutonium are stored within some of the canisters in a tube vault. No inventory limit on plutonium had been set as the foregoing assumption was that only trace amounts (less than 200 ppm) was commingled with the stored material. At this time, Building 3019 inspection activities remain suspended until criticality safety, authorization basis, radiation protection, and material accountability issues have been fully resolved. (3-A)