

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

August 30, 2002

TO: J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: Matt Forsbacka, Oak Ridge Site Representative
SUBJ: Activity Report for Week Ending August 30, 2002

The Site Representative was on leave Monday.

A. BWXT Y-12 Enriched Uranium Operations (EUO) Wet Chemistry Restart: The Operational Readiness Review (ORR) continued this week. Work evolutions and emergency operation demonstrations are nearly complete; however, a broad range of difficulties have been encountered that have resulted in ORR team members and EUO staff working extended hours to prevent significant slips in the schedule. Among the issues needing resolution during the course of the ORR were:

1. Operating procedure errors have been identified for nearly all of the systems being restarted. EUO personnel have been responsive in quickly addressing issues found during the course of the ORR, but it appears that some systematic causal issues may remain. BWXT Y-12 managers are planning to comprehensively address these issues next week.
2. An instance of an instrument calibration work instruction not being representative of conditions in the field was found by the ORR team. It appears that some instructions may not have been adequately verified and validated.
3. The ORR team discovered that some of the requalification training requirements and requirements that have been added since initial qualification for a Shift Supervisor had not been met. This was determined to be a violation of the staff qualification requirements in the Building 9212 Operational Safety Requirements. A subsequent management review found that all other Shift Supervisors were in compliance with all training and qualification requirements.

The ORR will continue next week with the completion of remaining evolutions, followup personnel interviews and documentation reviews, and report writing activities. (2-A)

B. BWXT Y-12 EUO Fire Protection: On Wednesday, the Site Representative, along with the YSO fire protection specialist and Wet Chemistry ORR personnel, observed BWXT Y-12 Fire Department personnel perform the system surveillance procedure for System 6, which provides sprinkler coverage to C-1 and D Wings in Building 9212. It appears that the necessary rigor in procedure compliance of this Safety Class system surveillance was not adhered to as a procedural step was skipped due to concerns with operating a badly corroded isolation valve. The system remains to be classified as inoperable, and hourly fire watches continue to be in effect. (2-A)

C. Price-Anderson Noncompliance Investigation: This week, YSO received notification from the DOE Office of Price-Anderson Enforcement that an investigation of welding inadequacies for the Building 9212 Hydrogen Fluorine Supply System and the Wet Chemistry Oxide Dissolver and Intermediate Evaporator systems (see weekly report for April 19, 2002) is to be initiated. (2-A)