

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

August 6, 2004

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director  
J. J. McConnell, Deputy Technical Director  
**FROM:** T. D. Burns/ J. S. Contardi  
**SUBJECT:** SRS Report for Week Ending August 6, 2004

**H-Canyon and HB-Line:** H-Canyon has processed 1461 Kgs of unirradiated Mk-22 targets. The contract target is 10,093 Kgs by the end of fiscal year 2006. H-Canyon is currently processing contaminated unirradiated Mk-22 targets. HB-Line Phase II recently completed its DOE readiness assessment for neptunium processing. Startup is expected to occur August 11 and the mission should last between 12-18 months. Upon completion of the neptunium processing and direct oxidation of a small quantity of residues, no future Phase II missions have been identified. HB-Line Phase I completed the last dissolution run of denitrator product and staffing levels are expected to be reduced from 4 shifts to 2. Following the denitrator campaign, the sole contractual HB-Line Phase I mission will be the dissolution of limited quantities of plutonium/beryllium scrap. Insufficient funding and mission direction from DOE will soon limit the operational efficiency of both facilities. Current funding does not support the Draft 2004 Performance Management Plan for accelerated cleanup.

**Salt Waste Processing Facility:** On Tuesday, critical decision-1 for the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF) was approved by DOE. In addition, DOE has approved the conceptual design and is awaiting a revised process hazard analysis which should be submitted in mid-August. Timely design, construction, and startup of SWPF will be instrumental in ensuring the future space demands of the high-level waste (HLW) system are met.

**Potential new leak site in Tank-12:** Tank 12 is a non-compliant Type I tank that has known leak sites. During a recent inspection, a new salt nodule was identified. The new salt nodule is above current waste levels, but indicates that some waste may have previously seeped through the inner tank wall. The new salt nodule in Tank 12 and the potential leak in Tank 9 (Site Rep Weekly 7/30/04) highlight the degrading condition of the aging HLW system, and the need to move forward with waste removal and stabilization.

**Update on Type A Accident Investigation:** The DOE Type A accident investigation Board arrived on site and has begun the formal investigation process. As a followup to the accident, DOE-SR held an all hands meeting to discuss the actions undertaken in response to the accident. Immediately following the accident all work involving the loading, unloading, and transportation of self propelled medium to heavy construction equipment was suspended. The Westinghouse Savannah River Company has initiated an independent investigation which is lead by the Operations Business Unit Manager.

**Solid Waste Management Facility:** For the second week in a row a technical safety requirement (TSR) violation was declared. The most recent TSR violation resulted from a failure to respond within 7 days to 2 drums that contain head space gases that exceed the lower flammability limit. Last weeks criticality TSR violation has resulted in a potential inadequacy in the safety analysis.