

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

April 16, 2004

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director  
**FROM:** T. Hunt and W. White, Pantex Site Representatives  
**SUBJECT:** Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending April 16, 2004

**DNFSB Activity Summary:** T. Hunt and W. White were on site all week.

**Material Movement:** Last week two pits were moved between magazines without an authorization from the Move Right System (MRS), a violation of procedural requirements. BWXT transportation personnel planned to move eight pits (six between zones and two between magazines). Because BWXT transportation personnel did not have access to an MRS terminal, they called the Operations Center (OC) to obtain authorization for the moves as required in P7-3400, *Material Movement Authorization*. The OC obtained authorization numbers from the MRS for the six pits being moved between zones, but the MRS returned an error message indicating the movement of the two pits between magazines would exceed the pit limit for one of the magazines. The MRS counts the material being moved against the inventory of both the dispatching and receiving locations until the movement is complete. Although pit storage limits in the magazine were never actually exceeded, counting the pits being sent as well as received against the allowed inventory led the MRS to reject the movement of pits to the magazine.

Confusion apparently existed in the communication between OC and transportation personnel as to the meaning of the error message. BWXT transportation personnel also appeared to assume the movement of the two pits between magazines was authorized because a separate program (Track Right) used to track material movements within and between certain magazines had not indicated an error when the move was entered into that system. BWXT implemented near-term compensatory measures to restrict certain material movements. [I, P3B]

**W78 Seamless Safety Process:** BWXT completed its contractor readiness assessment (CRA) for W78 cell operations this week. This second performance of the CRA became necessary when NNSA determined during its readiness assessment of the W78 seamless safety process earlier this year that it could not confirm the W78 cell process was ready for operations. The CRA identified six pre-start findings and one post-start finding. The pre-start findings include the following:

- The applicability matrices in the *Technical Safety Requirements for Pantex Facilities* had not been updated to incorporate the W78 seamless safety process.
- Lightning controls to address the recently identified lightning pathway from electrical circuits were not implemented adequately for use of a hoist to support task exhaust.
- A small number of errors existed in the W78 disassembly and inspection procedure.
- In four cases, the production technician who performed the original work also performed a verification of the work that should have been done by a second technician.

Other pre-start findings addressed the documentation of training required for production technicians and a legacy electrical conduit in the cell. The post-start finding addressed the failure to close a previous pre-start finding that both cell equipment doors should be shut during operations.

The repeat of the NNSA readiness assessment is scheduled for next week. BWXT plans to enter the NNSA RA with at least one known pre-start condition related to the need for final weapon response for auxiliary equipment. [I, W4]