

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

April 30, 2004

**TO:** K. Fortenberry, Technical Director  
**FROM:** D. Grover and M. Sautman, Hanford Site Representatives  
**SUBJ:** Activity Report for the Week Ending April 30, 2003

Tank Farms: In response to the Technical Safety Requirement violations discussed in last week's report, CH2M Hill Hanford Group (CHG) curtailed waste transfers, work on the Clean Out Boxes, and the Evaporator operational activities. In addition, CHG issued a standing order providing additional management expectations for responding to alarms that clear and restarting work following an alarm. The Office of River Protection also requested that prior to the resumption of waste transfers or evaporator operations, that CHG address issues with:

- 1) configuration control of drawings, labels, and processes when a deficiency is identified to prevent a similar instance from recurring;
- 2) clear understanding of conditions for clearing leak detector alarms so that positive evaluation is made of conditions and system operability;
- 3) evaluation of nuisance alarm and potential to desensitize operators to alarms; and
- 4) evaluation of operability for systems in which nuisance alarms routinely occur. (II)

Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP): The Implementation Validation Review (IVR) for the PFP D&D Documented Safety Analyses (DSA) commenced this week. The list of manageable pre-implementation actions appears to be excessive, especially as it includes DSA and Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) modifications which must be approved by DOE. In addition, work package preparation is still being done for two TSR surveillance requirements. Due to these concerns and preparation work for IVR team members changed due to conflict from delays in readiness, the IVR team plans to defer most activities until next week by which time many of the pre-implementation items are expected to be closed. (IV)

Sludge Retrieval and Disposition Project (SRDP): The contractor Operational Readiness Review (ORR) for the North Load-Out Pit sludge retrieval commenced this week. Operations demonstrations have been complicated by equipment failures, a containment glove bag was breached during process line disconnection from the sludge container and a threaded process vent port on the cask lid was found to be galled. In addition, the ORR team identified that the inspection tag on process shield plate rigging equipment that the project had inspected and approved for use in a critical lift was not valid. The project fabricated new tags, but when questioned whether the inspection records that would verify the information on the tags was valid were available for review a decision was made to reperform the inspection. The project also has not identified the need for a more frequent inspection for the cask lid lifting fixture required by the hoisting and rigging manual due to the actual load exceeding 65 percent of the rated load. These critical lifts were determined to be necessary because of Safety Analysis Report considerations of heavy load drops into the basin. During the emergency preparedness drill, the ORR team determined that the event scene response was adequate and performance in some area, e.g. radcon, to be above average. However, the command and control of the incident command post was not adequate primarily because of poor communications. (II)