

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

February 17, 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: J. S. Contardi/M.T. Sautman, SRS Site Representatives
SUBJECT: SRS Report for Week Ending February 17, 2006

Critiques: Based on observations of critiques and a review of the critique procedure, the Site Reps believe that critiques need to better examine the role work planning played in an event. The contractor is currently revising their critique procedure and considering this feedback.

F-Canyon Tank 804 Cleaning: The Site Reps provided the contractor comments on the draft Readiness Assessment (RA) Plan. In response, the contractor is clearly defining the RA scope, listing the prerequisites for starting the RA, adding lines of inquiry to include operational acceptance testing and nonconformance reports, and clarifying the role of cold run demonstrations for evaluating conduct of operations, procedures, and radiation protection.

The contractor has revised the authorization basis documents to address concerns raised by the Site Reps (Site Rep. weekly 1/20/06). Engineered controls have been added to protect facility workers from loss of confinement events. In addition, assumptions incorporated into the hazard analysis have been clarified such that potential accident scenarios are defined better.

Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF): The Site Reps have requested that the contractor explain the experimental test data that was used to validate their detonation models to ensure the model is applicable for DWPF configurations. In addition, the contractor chose to use the lowest experimental value for pressure amplification during a deflagration-to-detonation transition rather than the most probable or bounding value. Finally, the Site Reps are reviewing the decision to divide the Glass Waste Storage Building into two separate hazard category sections.

Systems Engineers: The Site Reps will be meeting with Engineering personnel because a review of qualification cards found some possible inconsistencies in the depth of training required as well as a very heavy reliance on courses and required reading (i.e., no field work).

Savannah River National Laboratory: In response to Site Rep comments, independent verification is now required for nuclear inventory control database entries. (Site Rep 12/16/05).

Controlled Burn: This week the United States Forestry Service conducted a controlled burn near H-Area. However, due to changing weather conditions heavier than anticipated smoke in and around H-Area resulted HB-Line shutting down supply fans and suspending operations until the smoke had dissipated.