

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

MEMO TO: J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: Timothy Hunt and Dave Kupferer, Pantex Site Representatives
DATE: 29 December 2006
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Weekly Report

Production Technician (PT) Work Hours: In an effort to standardize and control PT overtime, Manufacturing Division has developed guidelines that should reduce the likelihood that excessive hours will be worked. The 8-, 10-, and 12-hour weekday shifts have been clarified to be consistent across the division. In general, work will be limited to 8 hours on Saturday and no work will be authorized on Sunday. Overtime outside of these guidelines requires Division Manager approval with compensatory measures to ensure weekly work hours are not exceeded.

Building 12-44 (Cells 5 and 6) Upgrades: BWXT has completed a preliminary evaluation of options to upgrade 12-44, Cells 5 and 6. BWXT recommends the strategy whereby it is the general contractor and the cell upgrades are completed by July 2010. There are currently seven cells capable of supporting nuclear explosive assembly and/or disassembly operations. The upgrades to 12-44 Cells 2, 3, and 4 are nearly complete and startup of these facilities is scheduled for April 2007. Based on the draft *2007 Production and Planning Directive*—and without consideration of the potential Reliable Replacement Warhead workload—nine nuclear explosive operation cells must be configured for the full range of assembly/disassembly operations by October 2009, 11 by January 2013, and 13 by October 2014. To support these long-term mission needs, 12-44 Cells 1 and 8 also require upgrading.

Use of Device Assembly Facility (DAF) to Back Up Pantex: NNSA (NA-13) recently chartered a team to assess the potential to use DAF at the Nevada Test Site to provide back up to Pantex. The charter notes that Pantex has a substantial projected workload and a backup facility could handle assembly and disassembly overflow or provide support during circumstances where the availability of Pantex is reduced or suspended. The stated scope of the project is to review previous DAF utilization studies and prepare a report by April 2007.

Safety System Degradation: Last week, a sitewide power blink caused by electrical switching problems off-site knocked out the air handling units, uninterruptible power supply (UPS), and radiation alarm monitoring system (RAMS) equipment in Building 12-116. Due to the RAMS being non-functional, the facility was evacuated. Power was restored after the main breaker was reset several hours later but the UPS remained off-line. There is a Technical Safety Requirement that the UPS be operable to support the radiation monitoring equipment in two specific rooms of 12-116. As a result, the UPS was set in hard by-pass and two rooms in the building were placed in repair mode in accordance with the limiting condition for operation until repairs to the battery breaker were completed.

Special Tooling Program: BWXT completed a broad scope self-assessment of the special tooling program last week and concluded an adequate program is in place. The evaluation criteria were met for all 13 program elements reviewed. An observation was made that a couple tools were located in areas other than the one indicated in the tracking system. During the coming year, BWXT plans to develop a process to gauge tooling vendor performance, evaluate tooling repair work orders and the deviation process, and conduct assessments of the tooling inspection and quality assurance processes.