

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

November 28, 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director
J. J. McConnell, Deputy Technical Director
FROM: R. T. Davis/ T. D. Burns
SUBJECT: SRS Report for Week Ending November 28, 2003

Glass Waste Storage Buildings: As part of the recent annual update to the Defense Waste Processing Facility Documented Safety Analysis, the functional classification of the Glass Waste Storage Building #1 vaults and canister supports were downgraded from Safety Class (SC) to Safety Significant (SS). In justifying its approval of the downgrades, DOE-SR indicated that the previous functional classifications were not driven by the accident analyses, but were invoked by previous management discretion to provide conservatism for the first-of-a-kind facility. In approving the downgrades, DOE-SR has concluded that the additional conservatism is no longer warranted and that the accident analyses support the new functional classifications.

There is currently an operating forced-air ventilation system in Glass Waste Storage Building #1 which is not functionally classified as SC or SS. This week, WSRC received approval from its Facility Operations Safety Committee to take this system out of service (i.e. remove HEPA filters and shut-down fans) based on calculations demonstrating the acceptability of passive ventilation. WSRC is determining the appropriate schedule for implementing the ventilation system shutdown.

Both the functional classification downgrades and ventilation system shutdown for Glass Waste Storage Building #1 are being factored into the design of the new Glass Waste Storage Building #2. The design contractor (Parsons) for Glass Waste Storage Building #2 is being directed by DOE-SR to design the vaults and canister supports to PC-2 specifications commensurate with their SS functional classification. Additionally, DOE-SR is considering removing active ventilation from the design of the Glass Waste Storage Building #2.

F-Canyon Deactivation: On Monday, President Bush signed the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2004. Section 3115 includes modifications to the FY '01 National Defense Authorization Act related to the deactivation of the F-Canyon facility. Based on this legislation, DOE-SR informed WSRC that they could proceed with the F-Canyon Deactivation Project Plan. This action will allow WSRC to complete removal and disposition of PUREX solvents and disposition of depleted uranium solutions. In addition, WSRC can now deactivate additional PUREX systems.

In FB-Line, WSRC continues to stabilize plutonium oxide and package both oxides and metals in accordance with DOE Standard 3013. This activity supports Recommendation 2000-1 commitments to the Board and de-inventory of the FB-Line vaults. Currently, all of the plutonium composite material has been processed through the bagless transfer line.