

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

November 23, 2005

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director  
**FROM:** J. S. Contardi/M.T. Sautman, SRS Site Representatives  
**SUBJECT:** SRS Report for Week Ending November 25, 2005

Mark Sautman was out of the office this week.

**Decontamination and Decommissioning (D&D):** Currently, several former nuclear facilities (e.g., 777-10A, 305-A, 420-D, and 247-F) are being demolished following deactivation and decontamination. All of these facilities had previously contained significant quantities of nuclear materials and were internally contaminated. The decommissioning of Building 247-F will mark a significant milestone for D&D of legacy facilities in this contract period. The contractor expects to complete demolition of this facility by early next year.

This week, the Site Rep walked down the former Beta/Gamma Incinerator (Building 230-H). The facility was operated for several years in the mid-1980's to demonstrate incineration as a waste process technology for low-level combustible waste. The primary waste feed was contaminated solvents and solid waste forms consisting of cellulose, polyvinyl chloride, polyethylene and rubber. In 1988, DOE decided to discontinue incineration at SRS and the facility was placed in a safe condition. Recently, the contractor reentered the facility and characterized the remaining hazards. The contractor plans to initiate D&D work by the end of this year.

**K-Area Complex:** To support deinventory and deactivation of F-Area, two projects have been initiated in K-Area. These projects will allow interim storage of nuclear materials and the performance of required surveillances for currently stored materials packaged in 3013 containers. The current baseline for the interim storage will require the materials be packaged in 9975 Type B shipping containers but the inner package will not be a 3013 container. The planned packaging configuration will meet the interim safe storage criteria (ISSC) and the contractor will implement the associated surveillances required by the ISSC. Both projects will require a revision to the authorization basis and the contractor is preparing a safety basis implementation plan. The current schedule requires interim storage by March 2006 and a 3013 surveillance capability by November 2006.

**Saltstone Production Facility:** The contractor has completed and implemented an engineered path forward for saltstone production (Site Rep weekly 11/18/05). The previous process upset was determined to be caused by dry feed bridging in the weigh bin and a subsequent controller overshoot once the material began flowing. To prevent reoccurrence, facility personnel changed the controller feed profile from a ramp function to a step function, which should afford the operators time to react to unexpected feed rates. The initial dry feed rate was also reduced. Following the changes, the contractor attempted a limited grout run. During the run, the variable frequency drive (VFD) for the dry feed hopper tripped due to high current. Several attempts were made but at the reduce feed rate the VFD was not capable of overcoming the initial resistance with the screw feeders packed with dry feed.