

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

**MEMO TO:** Timothy J. Dwyer, Technical Director  
**FROM:** Timothy Hunt and Rory Rauch, Pantex Site Representatives  
**DATE:** 5 December 2008  
**SUBJECT:** Pantex Plant Weekly Report

**DNFSB Staff Activity:** Outside expert D. Boyd was onsite to perform a review of technical procedure adequacy and implementation.

**Justifications for Continued Operations (JCOs):** B&W Pantex has revised the site guidance for preparing JCOs as a lesson learned from the W76 electrostatic discharge (ESD) code blue. The new guidance gives the preparer the option to use a less labor-intensive format (a red-line strikeout of the affected pages in the applicable documented safety analyses (DSAs) is no longer required). This will give the decision-making authority a more expeditious option when determining the appropriate vehicle for issuing the DSA changes necessary to recover from an operational suspension. The new guidance still requires a description and analysis consistent with the requirements of DOE-STD-3009, *Preparation Guide for DOE Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses*. The additional detail required by the previous guidance was intended to aid in the processing of unreviewed safety questions (USQs). This was no longer deemed necessary because the need to process USQs against JCOs has become infrequent with the increased maturity of the Pantex DSA and a significant decrease in the number and duration of active JCOs.

**Procedure Adherence:** During W62 mechanical disassembly operations, a safety-related critical step was not performed. The preceding critical step required installation of a holding fixture that supports the unit in the assembly stand, if not already installed. Since the fixture was installed during work on a previous unit (the fixture is rarely removed from the stand), the reader correctly marked this step as not applicable. The next critical step was to verify the proper installation of the fixture prior to loading the unit. It was also determined to not be applicable and was not performed until prompted by the PXSO facility representative. W62 operations were suspended until the technicians were briefed on procedure performance expectations.

**Technical Procedures:** The staff performed a validation review of the W62 bay and cell dismantlement procedures as the technicians were executing them in the nuclear explosive facilities. Although the quality and usability of the procedures were satisfactory, a number of examples were identified where clarity, consistency, and processing direction could be improved.

**Funding Impacts on Safety System Improvements:** Due to FY09 funding uncertainties, upgrades to seismic outliers, emergency lights, and NUM-1 hoists have been identified as at-risk activities. The performance objective to develop and implement a prototype closed circuit television system may be removed from the FY09 performance evaluation plan altogether. The application of ESD flooring is being funded by FY08 carryover funds and is not currently at risk.

**Nuclear Explosive Safety (NES) Assessment Summary:** The NNSA NES branch recently issued a summary of concerns identified during FY08 assessments of the Pantex NES program. B&W Pantex has corrected or is in the process of correcting most of these concerns, such as ensuring the person-to-person [M] identifier is properly located in procedures to ensure adequate person-to-person coverage, adequately staffing the B&W Pantex NES program, and ensuring procedures adequately address person-to-person requirements for multiple configurations. B&W Pantex does not concur with concerns regarding a lack of tracking and trending for NES-related issues and an inadequate number of contractor assurance system assessments for NES activities.