

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

April 1, 2005

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director  
**FROM:** Michael J. Merritt, DNFSB Site Representative  
**SUBJECT:** Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory  
Report for Week Ending April 1, 2005

**WIPP Mobile Vendor Equipment Disposition:** On March 30, 2005, the Mobile Visual Examination and Repackaging Unit (MOVER) was shipped from LLNL to Los Alamos National Laboratory. Shipment of the MOVER completes the removal of WIPP Mobile Vendor equipment off site. LLNL completed planned shipments of transuranic waste off site in February, 2005 (see weekly report dated February 4, 2005), but removal of the MOVER unit was complicated by a contamination incident last summer. LLNL's assessment of the August 19, 2004, contamination event (see weekly report dated October 15, 2004) had identified a wide range of issues related to operation of the MOVER at LLNL.

**Radiological Control Program Review:** In mid-March a final report was issued providing the results of a for-cause appraisal of the LLNL radiation protection program. The LSO-chartered review was conducted during the period of January 18-28, 2005. The review was intended to evaluate occurrences of radiation contamination barrier failures and other observed weaknesses in the LLNL radiation protection program. The final report contains twelve findings and nine concerns. In addition to the specific issues, the report identified general concerns in the following areas:

- LLNL's issues management program is not effective;
- The Integrated Safety Management Program at LLNL does not effectively implement radiation protection program requirements; and
- There have been numerous failures by the LLNL staff to rigorously adhere to policies and procedures.

The Livermore Site Office (LSO) is reviewing the report and is expected to direct LLNL to address the findings in a corrective action plan.

**Heavy Element Facility Risk Reduction Program:** LLNL and LSO recently completed evaluations of the inventory of the Heavy Element Facility. The evaluations will be used to determine if the facility inventory of radioactive materials is below the threshold for a Hazard Category 3 facility per DOE-STD-1027-92, *Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports*. LLNL proposed excluding fixed contamination as part of the inventory calculations based on a consequence analysis. LSO rejected the proposal and insisted that LLNL use a threshold value for fixed contamination in determining the hazard categorization in accordance with the standard. LLNL's goal is to achieve Radiological Facility status by April 10, 2005.

**Independent Oversight Inspection:** On March 23, 2005, LSO conditionally approved the LLNL corrective action plan for the Department of Energy Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance (OA) inspection report (see weekly report dated March 25, 2005). However, LSO is requiring LLNL to resolve nineteen comments as conditions of approval. Several of the LSO comments relate to inadequacies in plans to correct administrative control programs in the Plutonium Facility, including the configuration management program.