

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

September 14, 2007

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director  
**FROM:** M.T. Sautman, SRS Site Representative  
**SUBJECT:** SRS Report for Week Ending September 14, 2007

**K-Area:** An operator reviewing videos of previous facility operations noticed that a forklift was used twice last week to carry two pallets of stacked shipping containers at once. This violated the Material Storage Program requirement in the Technical Safety Requirements that forklifts shall only handle one pallet at a time. It also exceeded the forklift's load capacity. All fuel movements and forklift operations were temporarily suspended until a Deliberate Operations Plan was put in place. Senior Supervisory Watches (SSW) are part of this plan.

**Tritium:** After spending approximately two weeks in reduced ventilation mode, normal ventilation was restored at the Tritium Extraction Facility (TEF). A temporary modification allowed only one of two recently upgraded programmable logic controllers to be on-line to address an electrical communications problem. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) sent the contractor a letter stating their expectation that ventilation systems for nuclear facilities will have high reliability and expressing concern about the normalization of deviations. NNSA requested that the contractor review the overall control system architecture and implementation of the control system design. The contractor also submitted a revised Responsive Operations Plan for TEF to NNSA.

Based on satisfactory SSWs, four shifts from two tritium facilities were released. The average SSW score for H Area Old Manufacturing actually decreased in four of five categories last week. The Site Rep passed on some observations about the SSW Review Board process used at tritium.

**Hanford S-102 Spill:** A contractor review concluded that there were no identical or very similar configurations at SRS and it was highly unlikely that one would be installed. However, the team believed that very close management attention was warranted for future modifications to support tank closure. An expanded extent of condition review was also advisable.

**Salt Waste Processing Facility:** The Energy Systems Acquisition Advisory Board approved Critical Decisions 2 and 3A. Board staff attended the 65% design review.

**Integrated Salt Disposition Projected:** Tie-ins were made to allow the first receipt of contaminated water (i.e., not high-level waste) into 512-S and allow integrated runs to begin. Transfers and processing operations will be repeated using a salt simulant and real process chemicals. The Facility Self-Assessment is ongoing.

**DOE Order 226.1:** Based on lessons learned from this year's assessments, the Executive Technical Management Board approved a new strategy for conducting assessments of DOE and contractor performance.