

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

September 7, 2007

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director  
**FROM:** M.T. Sautman, SRS Site Representative  
**SUBJECT:** SRS Report for Week Ending September 7, 2007

**Operations:** In light of the increased number of errors in routine work activities, the DOE-SR Manager told the contractor a more aggressive approach was needed to expand improvement initiatives, such as Senior Supervisory Watches (SSW), to other facilities.

- At H Tank Farm, an operator and tanker truck driver were sprayed with diluted caustic solution when a chemical hose was disconnected from the tanker without properly venting the caustic addition rig beforehand. Although both were wearing the required protective equipment, some caustic solution contacted the operator's ankle and the driver later reported some minor problems. As a result of this and the F Tank Farm contamination event (see last week's report), the contractor is expanding SSWs to include all F and H Tank Farm activities.
- K Area will also be implementing Senior Supervisory Watches as part of the corrective actions from a previous assessment. (See 8/3/07 Site Rep weekly report).
- H Canyon has moved from deliberate to normal operations with enhanced oversight. All shifts and unit operations have been released from SSW.
- The Site Rep observed transuranic waste remediation in F-Canyon. Daily management screening of drums to be processed, procedure revisions, and additional compensatory actions (e.g., SSWs, third party independent verification) have increased the rigor of inventory control implementation. The Site Rep noted that the rope restricting access to the "control room" was not always maintained during operations. A time out was also called when it was discovered that a drum required a procedure different from what was specified at the pre-job briefing.
- During the second week of SSWs at the tritium facilities, 23 of 33 observed shifts received a satisfactory grade. Many failures relate to procedure compliance, quality, and turnover issues.
- A Site Rep review of control room logbooks at H Area Old Manufacturing identified that a required notification was not made for a fire protection system impairment that extended beyond 72 hours. Some incomplete entries in other logs were also noted.
- The Tritium Extraction Facility continued to operate in a manual reduced ventilation mode, however, component-by-component testing had identified the likely cause on Friday.

**Criticality Safety:** Industry standards and DOE Order 420.1B require that no single credible event or failure can result in a criticality. In response to a DOE-SR letter, the contractor is deleting the option of allowing overlapping double contingency defenses if they are shown to be sufficiently reliable. The contractor is also reviewing all credible H-Canyon scenarios and crediting additional controls if needed to address common mode failures.

**K-Area Material Storage:** The fire detection system was declared operable this week.