

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

August 17, 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: J. S. Contardi/M.T. Sautman, SRS Site Representatives
SUBJECT: SRS Report for Week Ending August 17, 2007

H Area Material Disposition: The Site Rep observed portions of a dissolver cold run. The Plutonium-Beryllium Facility Self Assessment at HB-Line and H Canyon commences next week.

- The Senior Supervisory Watch (SSW) Review Board has released 3 of 4 shifts at H Canyon and one shift at HB-Line. These shifts will still be subject to SSW oversight when conducting unit operations that have not been released yet.
- A tank transfer was not automatically terminated because the distributed control system (DCS) calculated the total number of pounds to receive based on the desired freeboard height and initial specific gravity in the receiving tank. However, the solution being transferred was flush water with a lower specific gravity. An operator realized there was a problem, but could not shut the transfer down using the A-Line DCS. The transfer was terminated using the H Canyon control room DCS (just below the high level interlock set point). Liquid continued to drain causing a few hundred pounds of flush water to overflow into a connected tank.
- While performing soldering on the new hot crane, smoldering glue residue set off the fire alarm several times and ignited. The fire watch extinguished the small flames. A generic site pre-screen accident hazards analysis for brazing was used for this evolution rather than a job-specific one. Some of the controls that were briefed and implemented were also not documented.

F Canyon: An investigation determined that the data sheet reviewed during the critique on the Technical Safety Requirement violation (Site Rep weekly 8/3/07) was not the original one. Operators had discovered a math error with the fissile gram equivalent calculation for an earlier drum. After making the corrections, they received permission from their supervisor to redo the entire data sheet to make it easier to read and discarded the original one (rather than attaching it). The Site Rep attended the conduct of operations briefing to workers provided by management. In addition, while D&D workers vacuumed contaminated concrete dust, the dust collection bag of the HEPA vacuum burst. The contaminated dust then breached the screen and HEPA filter.

DOE Oversight: The impact of the Performance Assurance Council has been limited because there has been very little analysis of the 1000+ Type 2 and other assessments completed this fiscal year.

Emergency Preparedness (EP): The H-Area emergency response during the annual site EP exercise was graded Significant Weakness Red because: a) facility level radiological control (RC) response was inadequate; b) command and control of RC response was not established; and c) contamination control techniques, actions, and use of personnel protective equipment was improperly demonstrated or not demonstrated at all. Corrective actions are being developed.

Electrical: Hundreds of fuses across SRS will be replaced because water intrusion has caused boric acid to swell in some fuses and inhibit movement of the arcing rod. This was identified during an investigation into why feeder relays in both B and F Areas recently tripped before the fuses cleared.

Salt Waste Processing Facility: Washington Group turned over J Area to Parsons.