

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

February 16, 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: J. S. Contardi/M.T. Sautman, SRS Site Representatives
SUBJECT: SRS Report for Week Ending February 16, 2007

DNFSB Activity: This week, the DNFSB Technical Director, Kent Fortenberry, participated in a working group meeting regarding salt processing activities.

Staff members D. Burnfield, C. Goff, C. Roscetti, and outside expert D. Volgenau were on site for a review of work planning and control. The review team and the Site Rep reviewed work packages and walked down work areas in H-Tank Farm. The team also observed transuranic (TRU) waste repackaging activities in F-Canyon and a mock-up for the high activity waste drain repair in F/H Laboratory.

3H Evaporator: Following a recent process run, the contractor began a planned outage for the 3H evaporator. During the outage, high radiation alarms and continuous air monitoring alarms were received. In response to the alarms, the contractor barricaded and isolated the area. Subsequent radiological survey identified a high radiation area in a portion of the steam lift line outside of the facility. Measured radiation rates were as high as 40 R/hr on contact. To ensure the source of contamination does not increase the contractor has emptied the evaporator pot and will flush the steam line to reduce dose rates. Thus far, the dose rates have been reduced to approximately 2 R/hr. An engineering team has been established to determine the cause and identify corrective actions. A similar event occurred in July 2001.

HB-Line: The contractor held a critique to address an issue with a procedure non-compliance related to a Specific Administrative Control (SAC). The procedure required an engineering representative to document that a specific 3013 can had been analyzed for hydrogen generation. A second engineer was also required to verify that the can had been analyzed. Both engineers completed the procedure without verifying that the specific can had been analyzed. A subsequent procedure also implemented the SAC requirements and the discrepancy was identified by the shift technical engineer. The critique adequately identified the appropriate corrective actions.

Solid Waste Management Facility: As reported last week, the contractor is planning to vent two bulging TRU drums. Since the previous Response Plan did not adequately address drums with internal pressures greater than 6 psi, the contractor is preparing additional documentation to support the maximum pressure in which a drum could be vented without the potential for generating shrapnel as a result of a rapid pressure release.

Saltstone: The contractor continued to process Batch 0 material and has reached the processing goal for the material in Tank 50. Although additional waste is in Tank 50, the contractor intends to process this material along with Batch 1 waste material. While waiting to be authorized for Batch 1 waste, the contractor plans to intermittently process the Batch 0 waste to maintain proficiency.