

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

**MEMO TO:** J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director  
**FROM:** Timothy Hunt and Dave Kupferer, Pantex Site Representatives  
**DATE:** 10 August 2007  
**SUBJECT:** Pantex Plant Weekly Report

**W80 SS-21 Startup:** On Tuesday, PXSO approved BWXT's re-submittal of the W80 Hazard Analysis Report (HAR). PXSO did not impose any conditions of approval (COA) and only one technical review comment—formerly a post-start COA—was prescribed. PXSO acknowledged the effort made by BWXT to resolve the more than 90 preliminary comments developed by the Safety Basis Review Team. There are two relatively minor unreviewed safety questions (USQs) that have not yet been completed: reviews of a component packaging procedure and the Master Tester List (which requires Nuclear Explosive Safety approval). On Friday, BWXT initiated its contractor readiness assessment. The current schedule shows the Nuclear Explosive Safety Study (NESS) beginning on 20 August and the NNSA readiness assessment in early-September.

**Incorrect Procedure:** While performing radiography activities, the quality technicians realized they were using the procedure for a W76 disassembly and inspection unit on a unit undergoing life extension program operations. The incorrect procedure—which requires three additional x-ray shots—was inadvertently placed in the work package by document control personnel. Initially, process engineering identifies the technical documents needed to perform operations on a unit and a single document control person assembles the work package. The technicians are not required to verify the procedure number before using; only that the revision is correct. There was no direct safety issue in this case as the additional shots—although not performed—had been analyzed and approved for the program. Immediate actions implemented by BWXT were to validate that all currently issued work packages contain the correct procedures and a second check is now being performed at document control before issuing procedures.

**Nuclear Explosive Safety (NES) Oversight:** In June 2006, PXSO requested an exemption to the DOE-STD-3015-2001, *Nuclear Explosive Safety Study Process*, requirement that PXSO participate in all NES studies and change evaluations at Pantex. Neither the Cognizant Secretarial Officer or Central Technical Authority formally responded to the request so, in accordance with DOE M 251.1-1A, *Directives Manual System*, it was approved by PXSO after 30 days. In support of the request, PXSO stated that one of the benefits to be derived from an exemption would be that more time would be available for PXSO to oversee the day-to-day NES change control process and nuclear explosive operations. Shortly after this exemption was approved, the PXSO NES group was disestablished. Subsequently, two new positions were created at Pantex for NA-121.2 personnel to perform NES duties. Both these positions are filled; however, one of the two individuals is not yet fully qualified. It is unclear whether or not the NA-121.2 individuals at Pantex plan to assume the NES study participation requirement previously performed by the PXSO NES group.

**Separations Testing (Sep Test):** NNSA is planning to perform an Operational Safety Review (OSR) of Sep Test operations in lieu of a NESS during the week of 21 September. An expiring NESS of Sep Test operations was performed in 2002. OSRs are normally only performed on non-expiring NESSs. The 2002 study expires after 60 months—per DOE-STD-3015—because the safety basis was not 10CFR830 compliant at that time. OSR requirements are less rigorous and resource intensive than a NESS.