

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

August 31, 2007

**TO:** J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director  
**FROM:** R. Todd Davis/Donald Owen, Oak Ridge Site Representatives  
**SUBJECT:** Activity Report for Week Ending August 31, 2007

A. Facility Risk Review. In response to Board correspondence, Y-12 completed Facility Risk Reviews (FRRs) for Buildings 9212, 9215 and 9204-2E to identify prioritized listings of facility improvements to ensure safe operations for the next 15 years. The FRR for Building 9212 was discussed with the Board in December 2006 in response to the Board's letter of November 28, 2005 (see the 12/15/06 site rep. report). In a recent letter to YSO, BWXT expressed concern that no funding has been designated for execution of the FRRs consistent with the Project Execution Plan (in particular for fiscal year 2009). Tracking of FRR execution has been planned as a metric as part of future annual condition assessments for Building 9212 in response to the Board's letter of March 13, 2007. In discussions with the site reps. regarding the BWXT letter, YSO and BWXT management reaffirmed their commitment to FRR implementation.

B. Oxide Conversion Facility Restart. The Oxide Conversion Facility (OCF) in the Enriched Uranium Operations Building was last operated in late-September 2006. During a dock scrubber safety interlock surveillance in October 2006, a small amount of hydrogen fluoride (HF) was released from primary confinement. In January 2007, BWXT completed investigation and developed corrective actions for the HF release event (see the 1/19/07 site rep. report). Various OCF maintenance and safety basis implementation activities have been in progress since January but no operations with enriched uranium have been performed.

Last week, BWXT submitted an addendum to the BWXT Startup Notification Report (SNR) to YSO proposing that a contractor Readiness Assessment (RA) be performed to confirm readiness for OCF restart. BWXT also notes in the SNR addendum that a contractor RA is considered the appropriate readiness review level even if restart does not occur until after late-September (i.e., after more than one year since shutdown). BWXT management noted to the site rep. that OCF restart will likely not occur until October. YSO is reviewing this SNR submission.

C. Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility. BWXT causal analysis is nearing completion for the missing welds on certain structural steel joint connections in the Mechanical Electrical Building (MEB) reported on July 27<sup>th</sup>. Other welding non-conformances have been identified as part of extent-of-condition checks in the MEB (which is not a part of the safety-class storage area structure). BWXT management noted to the site reps. that this MEB welding was performed in early-2006 during development of actions to address broad quality assurance deficiencies with safety-class concrete/reinforcing steel installations.

D. Y-12 Nuclear Criticality Safety Program. This week, the Y-12 Nuclear Criticality Safety Committee briefed Y-12 management on results of their annual assessment of the Y-12 Nuclear Criticality Safety Program. The committee noted several findings regarding corrective actions for the April 2006 vacuum pump filter event and concluded that additional action is needed to institutionalize Uranium Holdup Survey Program improvements. One proficiency identified was the development of the Inadvertent Accumulation Prevention Program (IAPP) in response to the vacuum pump filter event (see 5/11/07 site rep. report). Execution of the IAPP, however, has been delayed and the program will likely not be completed this calendar year. The IAPP should help prevent inadvertent accumulation events such as the one noted in last week's report.