

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

June 8, 2007

TO: J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: R. Todd Davis/Donald Owen, Oak Ridge Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Activity Report for Week Ending June 8, 2007

Mr. Davis was out of the office this week.

A. Building 9212 Documented Safety Analysis Implementation. On Monday, BWXT management decided to start their independent Implementation Validation Review (IVR) of the controls in the Building 9212 Documented Safety Analysis. YSO also started their IVR that will be conducted concurrent with the BWXT review. The BWXT and YSO IVRs are scheduled to be completed by about June 22nd.

B. Uranium Processing Facility. Late last week, in preparing to proceed to Critical Decision-1 (alternative selection and cost range), YSO issued their Safety Evaluation Report (SER) on the safety design strategy and the preliminary hazard analysis documents. While accepting BWXT's proposed safety controls in general, the YSO SER specified several Conditions of Approval. YSO called for actions such as: establishing certain accident analysis capability; evaluating hazardous material confinement capability; classifying nuclear material containers as safety-significant; and providing safety-significant backup power equipment for fire suppression, glovebox inerting and criticality accident alarm systems. Critical Decision-1 approval by NNSA Headquarters is now anticipated by July.

C. Uranium-233 Disposition at ORNL. DOE Headquarters approved Critical Decision-2/3A (approve performance baseline and start long-lead equipment procurement) for the down-blending project in late May. DOE-ORO management had noted that natural phenomena hazard evaluation of the ventilation stack adjacent to Building 3019 needed to be addressed to support this approval (see the 3/2/07 site rep. report). DOE's evaluation has indicated the potential need to modify the stack to preclude damage during future down-blending operations in Building 3019. DOE-ORO management noted that the down-blending project baseline planning has been revised to include stack modification options. DOE-ORO is planning to conduct a project design review by September. Preparations continue by Isotek for dismantlement and removal of legacy process equipment to make room for new down-blending equipment.

D. Activity-Level Work Planning. In 2004, Y-12 conducted a review of work planning processes for addressing infrequent, potentially hazardous activities (see the 1/23/04 site rep. report). BWXT then developed two sets of criteria that would trigger successively higher levels of review and approval within BWXT management (see the 3/12/04 and 4/8/04 site rep. reports). Work planning for activities meeting the first set of criteria would be reviewed by a facility-level Operational Safety Board (OSB) and those meeting the second set would be reviewed by a site-wide Management Review Board. Site rep. review of the current criteria identified that an original first set criterion had been deleted. The deleted criterion had called for OSB review of maintenance or service activities that had not been performed in the past 18 months. The site rep. has inquired with YSO and BWXT management on the specific basis for the change and whether the present criteria adequately covers infrequent, potentially hazardous activities.