

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

February 23, 2007

**TO:** J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director  
**FROM:** R. Todd Davis/Donald Owen, Oak Ridge Site Representatives  
**SUBJECT:** Activity Report for Week Ending February 23, 2007

Mr. Davis was at Los Alamos National Laboratory this week.

A. Conduct of Operations. As reported on February 9<sup>th</sup>, based on several recent events at the Enriched Uranium Operations Building, BWXT building management was providing reinforcement training to operations personnel covering various aspects of Conduct of Operations. One of the events was storage of two containers at a location not authorized for the particular container design per criticality safety requirements. BWXT investigation has determined that among multiple errors and chances to avoid the storage deficiency was a lack of attention to detail by the fissile material handler in the check of compliance prior to storing the containers. The lessons-learned from this event including emphasis on proper fissile material handler check of compliance when storing fissile material containers were briefed to building personnel. BWXT management informed the site rep. that actions to address the event for fissile material handlers in other Y-12 facilities are to be developed.

BWXT efforts continue under the site-wide Conduct of Operations improvement initiative (see the 12/15/06 site rep. report). As a part of the action to provide training on conservative decision making, BWXT management has decided to produce a video presentation from senior BWXT management discussing applicable principles and case studies. YSO management has requested that BWXT provide an update on the overall initiative in early-March.

B. Y-12 Infrastructure Supporting Manufacturing. In December, the YSO Manager submitted to NNSA Headquarters a formal request to commission an independent panel of industry experts to address YSO and BWXT concerns with funding shortfalls in the infrastructure supporting manufacturing operations. Such infrastructure includes production equipment, technical support, maintenance, spare parts, etc. The YSO Manager noted in the request that funding for manufacturing infrastructure has been reduced over recent years and has reached the point where production deliverables are at risk with potential for adverse impact on safety. YSO management noted to the site rep. that NNSA Headquarters has agreed to the request and conduct of the review has been incorporated into the Y-12 Throughput Improvement Plan (see the 10/20/06 site rep. report). The review is scheduled to start in late-April.

C. Rackable Can Storage Box Loading Campaign. As reported on November 3<sup>rd</sup>, BWXT was loading cans into new Rackable Can Storage Boxes (RCSBs) that are planned for use in the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility. BWXT management had indicated that only stainless steel cans with uranium metal had been planned to be loaded into RCSBs during Fiscal Year 2007. A large portion of those cans, however, continue to be found to not meet the recently revised lid seal inspection requirements. As a result, and to alleviate ongoing Warehouse storage space concerns, BWXT management intends to begin loading RCSBs with stainless cans containing uranium oxide and with carbon steel cans with metal (preferably) or oxide. BWXT management noted that such RCSB loading may require future RCSB unloading and container repackaging depending on requirements to be established by DOE in response to the Board's Recommendation 2005-1, *Nuclear Material Packaging*.