

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

June 1, 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: M. J. Merritt, DNFSB Site Representative
SUBJECT: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL)
Report for Week Ending June 1, 2007

Independent Oversight Inspection: This week an inspection team from the Department of Energy Office of Environment, Safety, and Health Evaluations (ES&H), HS-64 (formerly OA-40), released its final report, *Inspection of Environment, Safety, and Health Programs at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, May 2007*. The purpose of the inspection was to assess the effectiveness of ES&H programs at LLNL. Areas of review included implementation of the core functions of integrated safety management (ISM), focusing on work planning and control systems at the activity and facility level, operations in the Superblock, essential safety system functionality, and effectiveness of the Livermore Site Office (LSO). Some specific areas of review were the corrective actions taken by LLNL and LSO to address safety issues identified in the previous inspection in 2004 (see weekly report dated January 14, 2005) and the functionality of the Plutonium Facility glovebox ventilation system and fire suppression system. The review of these systems was intended to evaluate the effectiveness of LLNL programs and processes for configuration management, surveillance, testing, maintenance, operations, and feedback and improvement of the systems.

The report identifies both positive aspects of ES&H performance as well as weaknesses. Positive attributes included LLNL's process for annual team assessments of ISM implementation through work control document evaluations and work observations, and the Superblock work control process that systematically categorizes all work and specifies how associated hazards are identified and controlled. Weaknesses identified in the report include some deficiencies in maintenance and procurement of safety system components, and the effectiveness of feedback and improvement for both LLNL and LSO. A corrective action plan to address the identified deficiencies is required within 60 days.

LLNL Management Contract: On May 30, 2007, Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC (LLNS) – a team consisting of Bechtel National, University of California, BWX Technologies, Washington Group International, and Battelle – announced the key senior management personnel that will begin directing LLNL operations on October 1, 2007. On that date, the current laboratory director will become the president of LLNS and will lead the incoming team under the new contract. Contract transition activities are underway for both LLNL management and LSO. Facility walk-down inspections and reviews of existing safety procedures will begin in July and be completed in September. The timing for the submission of the contractor assurance system (CAS) plan by the LLNS transition team and the review of the CAS plan by LSO has not yet been finalized. Based on the high-level organizational structure of the LLNS team, significant organizational restructuring at lower levels is inevitable. For example, a new associate director level position for nuclear operations has been created in the LLNS organization that does not presently exist. The details of the relationship between facility operations and national defense programs will likely necessitate management changes in nuclear facility operations. Presently, both nuclear facilities management and national defense program management report to a common LLNL program leader.