

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

February 11, 2022

TO: Christopher J. Roscetti, Technical Director
FROM: B. Caleca, P. Fox, and P. Meyer, Hanford Resident Inspectors
SUBJECT: Hanford Activity Report for the Week Ending February 11, 2022

Hanford Site: A resident inspector observed a board, led by the ORP deputy manager, conduct the final oral examination of a Facility Representative candidate who will be assigned to oversee the WTP. This examination focuses on knowledge of operations and safety systems, roles and responsibilities, and the application of DOE directives. The board's examination was rigorous, and the board voted to pass the candidate.

Brian Harkins, the current Deputy Assistant Manager for Tank Farms, was named as the Assistant Manager for Mission Support.

Waste Treatment Plant (WTP): The WTP contractor communicated to DOE their status of addressing Board safety issues related to ammonia storage at the WTP site. The safety issues, which were forwarded to DOE in 2011, identified deficiencies in the protection of workers in control rooms, seismic design of the storage facility, control of hazards associated with accidents that might occur during ammonia delivery, and other potential facility impacts that could result from a large ammonia release. The correspondence describes the set of engineered and administrative controls that the contractor has implemented under the site's Chemical Safety Management Program to prevent or mitigate the hazards resulting from an ammonia release. It also describes the design of the emergency planning program and the elements of the program that would provide protection for workers if an ammonia release were to occur. The contractor further noted that, although they have adequately addressed the safety issues to support startup and operation of the Direct Feed Low-Activity Waste mission, they will further review the hazards and associated controls to ensure they are adequate to support the High-Level Waste mission. They intend to complete the aspects of that evaluation that are related to the High-Level Waste Facility late this calendar year. Necessary work to support the Pretreatment Facility (PTF) will occur when DOE decides to resume PTF design and construction.

Central Waste Complex (CWC): While performing routine container integrity surveillances, a worker found an unknown material on the outside of a 55-gallon galvanized drum containing transuranic waste. The container was not obviously degraded or damaged. The worker placed their work in a safe condition and exited the warehouse. Facility management subsequently restricted access to the facility and entered the appropriate Limiting Condition for Operations. The following day, a re-entry team obtained surveys of the drum that identified low levels of loose alpha and beta contamination in the vicinity of the material. However, the re-entry team was unable to identify a definitive source for the contamination since there was no visible container degradation. The drum was subsequently overpacked into an 85-gallon drum to prevent a loss of control of the discovered contamination and preclude any potential for additional contamination release. Surveys performed during the overpack activity did not identify any additional spread of contamination. The resident inspector that tracked the event and observed the drum overpack work noted that contractor personnel professionally managed and accomplished the activities related to the event.