

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

January 14, 2022

TO: Christopher J. Roscetti, Technical Director
FROM: L. Lin, Z. C. McCabe, E. P. Richardson, Resident Inspectors
SUBJECT: Savannah River Site Activity Report for Week Ending January 14, 2022

H-Canyon: Last week, an operator noticed water in a trough outside a door to a sealed storage room in the Section 9 personnel tunnel. Radiological Protection Department (RPD) personnel smeared the area and measured 200 dpm/100cm² alpha and 150,000 dpm/100cm² beta-gamma. RPD personnel then barricaded and posted the area as a High Contamination Area/Airborne Radiation Area. The source of the water was determined to be from a failed steam coil located in the supply plenum directly above the storage room. The storage room, which contains legacy contamination from past operations, is accessed every three months for routine monitoring. The steam is used to heat the building, and there were no indications from the temperature monitoring that there was a problem with the system. Personnel are monitoring the plenum and pumping out water as necessary. They are evaluating if there are any similar areas that are not commonly accessed and will validate the preventive maintenance program on the ventilation system.

Earlier this week, an H-Canyon Outside Facilities first line manager (OF-FLM) was attempting to populate their role on the watch bill and discovered that one of their qualifications had expired while they were on shift the previous day. Therefore, they were not certified to fulfill the Technical Safety Requirements minimum staffing requirement for the latter part of the previous shift. The qualifications that expired were for the area emergency response organization (ERO) qualifications. He had previously attempted to register for the course required to keep the qualifications but was unsuccessful. The individual was populated on the initial watch bill since the site's Learning Management System (LMS) only reviews an individual's qualification when the watch bill is generated and does not ensure they will remain qualified through the entire shift. Additionally, both the individual and the Shift Operations Manager (SOM) who approved the watch bill did not realize that the ERO qualifications were tied to the OF-FLM qualifications. In addition to using the LMS, the FLMs are expected to populate the watchbills and check the certifications manually. In this case, the FLM did not catch that the qualification expiration would occur in the middle of a shift. SRNS personnel will reinforce expectations for the preparation of watchbills and execution of training. This issue will be included in the ongoing LMS improvement initiatives due to previous issues (see 10/29/21 report).

Liquid Waste Contract Transition: The resident inspector observed a walkdown of the Defense Waste Processing Facility by the Savannah River Mission Completion contractor team.

H-Area New Manufacturing (HANM): During a transfer of gas to a mix tank, an operator accidentally closed the wrong valve, resulting in a rupture disc blowing before the interlock could activate. When the pressure gage reached the desired pressure, the operator was to stop the transfer by closing a valve on the suction side of the pump. The system is set up so that multiple screens can be displayed, and different components can be selected on each screen. The operator thought he was giving the command to close the mix tank outlet valve on one screen, but it gave the command to close the pump discharge valve that was last selected on the other screen, resulting in a rapid pressure increase. The contractor is developing training to address this issue.