

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

December 10, 2021

TO: Christopher J. Roscetti, Technical Director
FROM: L. Lin, Z. C. McCabe, E. P. Richardson, Resident Inspectors
SUBJECT: Savannah River Site Activity Report for Week Ending December 10, 2021

Eric Richardson reported for duty as a resident inspector.

Contract Transition: Savannah River Mission Completion has begun contract transition efforts which are scheduled for completion in the first quarter of CY2022.

Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF): While transferring solution as part of the recovery plan to remove solids (see 12/3/21 report), the control room received a high gamma alarm associated with the Barium Decay Tank (BDT). They determined it was due to shine from the nearby lines from the transfer rather than the BDT lines. Though the detectors and BDT interlocks were operational, the facility decided to enter the associated Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO). Last Thursday, operators were performing monthly pump rotations and ran the pumps for a few seconds, which violated the LCOs. The pump rotations are being evaluated and all work associated with them will be moved into a work package or a procedure. The facility is also developing Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) training.

DOE-SR transmitted a letter of concern to Parsons regarding the three recent TSR violations (see above and 11/19/21 and 11/26/21 reports). The letter directs Parsons to perform an assessment of these issues and corrective actions. Additionally, Parsons is initiating a Management Control Plan that will require all work to be performed under Senior Supervisory Watch (SSW). Work will be scheduled around the available SSWs until additional personnel can assist.

H-Tank Farms: Tank Farms personnel held an issue investigation to discuss the errors associated with taking TSR surveillance readings on the wrong instrument (see 12/3/21 report). Personnel noted that it was difficult to tell from the drawings that the lockout would result in a credited flow indicator being de-energized. One shift manager, remembering a similar lockout, wrote a note on the impact sheet that the flow indicator would be de-energized. The operators attempting to install the lockout questioned the hazard category rating of the breakers. After review, it was determined that the lockout could be performed as written and was re-printed, but impact sheets are not part of the lockout. The facility did not enter the appropriate LCO for the indicator being out of service. The operator performing the TSR surveillance on night shift was in communications with the Shift Operations Manager (SOM), but it was not clear that they were reading from a non-credited flow indicator that was on the same line. After shift turnover, the day shift operator doing the surveillance similarly recorded the non-credited instrument reading. Corrective actions identified include clarifying expectations for taking TSR readings, retention of the LCO impact sheets, and clarifying the drawings.

H-Canyon: A cooling water pump was inadvertently started when a person not authorized to operate the equipment pressed the on button, thinking it was a lamp test button. They contacted the SOM and operators quickly shut down the pump. Corrective actions are being developed to reinforce expectations for personnel in the field.