

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

November 19, 2021

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** Christopher J. Roscetti, Technical Director  
**FROM:** D. Gutowski, Resident Inspector  
**SUBJECT:** Los Alamos Activity Report for Week Ending November 19, 2021

**Transuranic Waste Facility (TWF):** On Monday, TWF personnel identified that they had not completed three required monthly surveillances supporting compliance with the facility's Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) within the required timeframe. The surveillances involved verifying compliance with requirements on outdoor combustibles, outdoor equipment, and banding of drums on the third tier of stacked arrays. Soon after discovering the issue, facility personnel performed the surveillances with satisfactory results. The performance delay was within the 25% extension that is allowed by the TSR. Facility management is evaluating means to prevent recurrence of missed TSR surveillances including improving surveillance scheduling processes.

**Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility (WETF):** Off shift early on Monday, the fire department and facility duty officer responded to a fire alarm at WETF. They discovered the alarm was due to water flow and found evidence that the flow had come from a fire riser drain. They reset the system after sweeping the facility. A few hours later, the system alarmed again. This time, the responders found active flow from the drain. To evaluate and repair the system, the facility entered the limiting condition for operation for the safety significant wet-pipe fire sprinkler system being inoperable which initially requires a fire watch. Spare parts to repair the system were on hand, and it has been repaired. The leak appeared to be the result of a missing bolt in the alarm check valve. Further investigation to determine if the bolt is held up in the system is planned.

**Plutonium Facility–Safety Basis:** Last week, Triad submitted to the NNSA Field Office for approval the Evaluation of the Safety of the Situation and Justification for Continued Operations (ESS/JCO) pertaining to the potential inadequacy of the safety analysis and positive unreviewed safety question that stemmed from the July overflow event (see 8/6/2021 report). The submittal includes an extent of condition evaluation to determine what other systems could pose a risk of an overflow event. Operational restrictions on these systems remain in place and are elevated to TSR-level through the proposed ESS/JCO.

**Area G:** On Thursday, N3B personnel performed another operations-based emergency drill for glovebag operations in the Dome 231 Perma-Con (see 10/29/2021 report). The scenario involved a medical emergency for a worker performing transuranic waste operations in the glovebag. The participants exercised practices for balancing radiological control and a medical emergency within an airborne radiation area. One key item uncovered during the drill was that the automated external defibrillator the participants obtained had not been surveilled and needed a new battery.