

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

February 12, 2021

**TO:** Christopher J. Roscetti, Technical Director  
**FROM:** B. Caleca and P. Fox, Hanford Resident Inspectors  
**SUBJECT:** Hanford Activity Report for the Week Ending February 12, 2021

**DNFSB Staff Activity:** Members of the technical staff met with DOE-RL and Central Plateau Cleanup Company personnel for the second in a series (see 11/20/2020 report) of discussions that support a technical staff review of the approach used by DOE to control hazards at the Central Waste Complex.

**Tank Farms:** The Safety Basis Approval Authority approved a change to the Tank Farm Documented Safety Analysis (see 2/5/2021 and 1/29/2021 reports). The change analyzes operation of the Tank Side Cesium Removal (TSCR) system in support of the Direct Feed Low Activity Waste mission, as well as related modifications to AP Tank Farm systems. The contractor will implement the change prior to their declaration of readiness for the TSCR system.

**Central Waste Complex:** Facility personnel stopped work and exited the building when they discovered a corroded waste drum in 2403-WA. Facility operations entered the appropriate limiting condition for operations, restricted access to the building, and developed a re-entry plan. Surveys performed by the re-entry team did not identify any radiological or chemical releases from the drum. A subsequent operability evaluation of the safety-significant drum determined that it had degraded to the point where it could no longer perform its safety function. Workers over-packed the drum to remediate the condition.

**Onsite Transportation:** In July 2020, during their review of a revision of the site Transportation Safety Document (TSD), which analyzes safety and identifies controls for onsite waste shipment, DOE-RL determined that the TSD was not compliant with a requirement established in DOE Order 460.1D, *Hazardous Material Packaging and Transportation*. The requirement states that TSDs that are used for onsite shipments involving nuclear facility Hazard Category 2 or 3 quantities must comply with the Safety Basis Requirements of 10 CFR Part 830, Subpart B. DOE Order 460.1D was issued in December 2016. The requirements in the existing TSD are based on the previous version of the order which did not include the requirement. DOE-RL notified the contractor of the deficiency when it was discovered. In January 2021, the contractor determined that the condition constituted a potential inadequacy in the safety analysis (PISA). This week, they determined that the PISA is a positive unreviewed safety question and are performing an evaluation of the safety of the situation.

**Central Plateau Risk Management (CPRM):** Contractor personnel held a Hazard Review Board (HRB) meeting to review a new high risk survey and sampling work package for the REDOX canyon facility. This would be the first higher risk work conducted since the contractor lifted a stop work on radiological activities in the facility that was put in place due to concerns with contamination control practices and response to abnormal conditions (see 10/16/2020 report). The work package is unusual in that the main work instruction provides an umbrella of industrial hygiene and radiological controls for tasks performed under separate description sheets for different work activities. At this HRB, only two description sheets had been prepared. The HRB voted to reject the work package to allow planners to correct discrepancies in the work documents that were identified during the meeting.