

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

November 27, 2020

**TO:** Christopher J. Roscetti, Technical Director  
**FROM:** Miranda McCoy, Resident Inspector  
**SUBJECT:** Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending November 27, 2020

**Procedures:** Earlier this month, CNS declared a technical safety requirement violation after production technicians (PT) performed work to an outdated copy of a procedure that did not implement an operational restriction (see 11/13/20 report). Recently during preoperational checks, PTs on the same weapon program noted that the printed procedure copy they had available in their folder did not match the indexed copy in the electronic system. Process engineers determined that six printed procedure copies for that weapon program did not match the indexed procedure. In particular, the printed copies correctly included an annotated change for the operational restriction, but incorrectly obscured a step in the procedure. Process engineering had attempted to correct the obscured step; however, the incorrect version was indexed. Process engineering later wrote an additional annotated change, but the previously indexed annotated change was not flowed into the printed copies. While the printed procedures were available for use, PTs did not perform work to the incorrect copies.

During the extent of condition review for this event, CNS process engineering personnel noted that PTs had performed work in a nuclear explosive facility using an incorrect revision of a separate procedure. A general nuclear explosive safety rule requires that nuclear explosive operations are performed in accordance with approved written procedures.

**Nuclear Explosive Safety:** NNSA conducted a nuclear explosive safety change evaluation (NCE) regarding a proposal for a counter-unmanned aerial vehicle system. The NCE was purely focused on installation of the system; use of the system will be evaluated during a subsequent NCE. NNSA concluded the NCE with no findings and one deliberation topic. The deliberation topic discussed the potential for inadvertent radiofrequency output from the system and evaluated the administrative controls in place to prevent inadvertent output. The nuclear explosive safety study group determined that the information in the deliberation topic did not constitute a nuclear explosive safety concern.

**Safety Basis:** CNS received approval by NPO for an extension for eight justifications for continued operations and two hazard analysis report annual updates. CNS cited COVID-19 pandemic and weather-related difficulties that resulted in the need for extensions. NPO previously approved relief from schedule requirements for a number of safety basis deliverables due to COVID-19 pandemic-related delays in April of this year (see 5/1/20 report).

**Cable Ties:** This month, CNS completed all required replacements of cable ties—as well as required documentation for completion—stemming from an event early this year in which CNS personnel observed a plastic cable tie fall from an overhead facility crane hoist (see 2/21/20 report). Plastic cable ties were used to secure pneumatic lines; however, the potential to fail and fall resulted in CNS safety analysis engineering declaring a potential inadequacy of the safety analysis. CNS replaced the plastic ties with stainless steel ties. The stainless steel ties are subject to commercial grade dedication and are not expected to fail in a similar manner.