

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

October 30, 2020

TO: Christopher J. Roscetti, Technical Director
FROM: M. Bradisse, B. Caleca and P. Fox, Hanford Resident Inspectors
SUBJECT: Hanford Activity Report for the Week Ending October 30, 2020

Liquid Effluent Retention Facility (LERF): The DOE senior review board (SRB) met to discuss the justification for continued operations (JCO) at LERF Basin 44 (see 10/23/2020 report). The JCO allows limited contractor operations to support environmental compliance and prevent the spread of contamination. Additionally, the JCO allows the contractor to perform activities that will inform the development of a new hazard categorization for field office approval. These activities include the transfer of liquid to other basins, and removal and characterization of suspended and settled solids. The SRB recommended approval of the JCO.

Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant: The contractor's executive safety review board (ESRB) met to discuss the development and implementation of the requirements management program. This is one of thirty-four programs that the ESRB is reviewing as part of the contractor's readiness assurance process for the Low Activity Waste Facility. Most of the discussion centered on the program's staffing plan. It was determined that the staffing plan allocates sufficient resources, and that the plan could be revised to reflect any potential future changes to the program's work scope. The ESRB voted to move the program forward.

222-S Laboratory: While performing work to remove wiring from a control box in support of ongoing facility fire protection system modifications, electricians discovered that power sources to the panel were not fully controlled. Although circuit breakers that provide electrical power to the control panel were open, a necessary lockout/tagout (LOTO) was not installed. An initial event investigation indicated that the work package did not include LOTO requirements for this work scope. This event, together with previous problems encountered during the performance of this modification (e.g., see 9/4/2020 report), indicates a need to improve the planning and review of electrical and control system work at the facility. It also raises questions related to worker knowledge and awareness of work conditions and actions necessary to ensure their safety.

Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility: A Radiological Control Technician (RCT) identified contamination on the facility crane that exceeded the levels allowed by the Radiological Work Permit. The area had been previously decontaminated and earlier surveys indicated only very low levels of contamination in the area. Workers appropriately discontinued work and management held an In Progress ALARA Review (IPAR). Based on information collected during the IPAR, attendees determined that contamination most likely leached from a nearby crane bumper pad. The event did not result in personnel contamination, and subsequent surveys did not identify any spread of contamination beyond the area identified by the RCT.

A worker entered a control panel that had open energized electrical terminals. Information from a critique meeting indicated a lack of formality in addressing potential hazardous energy conditions within the facility. Additionally, similar to the event noted above for the 222-S Laboratory, the event raises questions regarding worker knowledge and awareness of actions necessary to ensure their safety.