

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

October 23, 2020

**TO:** Christopher J. Roscetti, Technical Director  
**FROM:** M. Bradisse, B. Caleca and P. Fox, Hanford Resident Inspectors  
**SUBJECT:** Hanford Activity Report for the Week Ending October 23, 2020

**Central Plateau Risk Mitigation (CPRM):** A resident inspector accompanied contractor personnel to observe the state of the BC Controlled Area (BCCA) now that routine surveys of the area have resumed. Since February, the contractor has made several changes to area postings after a resident inspector observed site personnel violating administrative postings to enter the BCCA, most notably Soil and Groundwater personnel performing routine well sampling. While not a violation of radiological controls, accessing the BCCA without notifying the CPRM shift office could lead to issues with accountability if an incident occurred on the site. In addition, some postings within the BCCA had degraded or been damaged by wildlife. New, more visible postings installed at entry points provide additional information about radiological conditions, and damaged radiological signs and chains have been replaced. These changes are intended to reduce the risk of site personnel inadvertently entering contamination areas, as well as improve compliance with administrative postings.

**Emergency Preparedness:** Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS) personnel conducted two evaluated drills this week. The first scenario was a forklift accident and subsequent drum spill at the 222-S Laboratory, resulting in material release and personnel injuries. This was an incident command post (ICP) limited drill. Six members of the 222-S Laboratory emergency response organization (ERO) were evaluated for proficiency, including ICP and event scene personnel. The second scenario was a rigging accident at the tank farms during the removal of a salt-well screen from tank A-103, resulting in personnel contamination. This was an event scene limited drill, the first evaluated drill of this type that WRPS has conducted since initiation of the COVID-19 partial stop work orders in March. Six members of the tank farms ERO were evaluated for proficiency, including ICP and event scene personnel. During the hotwash for the second drill, controllers noted that subsequent drill activities would benefit from additional controllers, particularly at the event scene, as drill scenarios become more complex and involve more players.

**Liquid Effluent Retention Facility (LERF):** The WRPS Plant Review Committee (PRC) met to discuss the justification for continued operations (JCO) and unreviewed safety question determination (USQD) at LERF Basin 44. In 2019, WRPS declared a potential inadequacy of the safety analysis when samples indicated the presence of solids containing higher than expected material at risk (MAR). WRPS had previously declared a negative USQD for the basin due to revised estimates showing less than hazard category 3 quantities of MAR; however, this report was not approved by the field office (see 3/20/2020 report). The PRC voted to approve a positive USQD for Basin 44, as well as a JCO to act as an interim safety basis document to support the use of the recirculation pumps and pumping down of free liquids. The JCO will support limited sampling to further characterize the basin, but will not support more intrusive work that will be needed later to support repair or replacement of the Basin 44 cover. WRPS intends to use the additional sampling information to inform the development of a new hazard categorization document for field office approval.