

## APPENDIX 4

### **REQUEST FOR BOARD ACTION BY A BOARD MEMBER**

Requester: Joyce Connery October 1, 2020

#### **Brief description of Requested Action:**

Request that the Board approve the attached final version of the FY2021 Work Plan.

Attachments (init) 1

Summarize any time sensitive considerations:

Requestor signature On File October 1, 2020

Assistant Executive secretary On File October 1, 2020

**DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD**

**FISCAL YEAR 2021 WORK PLAN**

**August 2020**

## **Table of Contents**

1. Office of the General Manager FY2021 Strategic Projects List
2. Office of the General Counsel FY2021 Strategic Projects List
3. Office of the Technical Director FY2021 Work Plan

**DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD**

**Office of the General Manager**

**FISCAL YEAR 2021  
OGM STRATEGIC PROJECTS LIST**

## OGM Planned Discretionary Work for FY 2021

### **Strategic Cross-Cutting Work**

- Finalize Human Capital Plan
- Explore agency-wide knowledge management solutions
- Update five-year IT strategic plan
- Request Congressional Research Service conduct a 30 Year In Review of DNFSB

### **Board Operations**

- Improve external communications with the interagency, Congress and Interest Groups
- Regularly review Board policies and procedures (update 1 Directive or Operating Procedure per quarter)
- Enhance agency-wide communications (through regular updates or All-Hands)
- Develop agency-wide guidelines for written work products
- Continue migration of OGM and OGC intranet content to SharePoint

### **Facilities**

- Phase 1 DNFSB Space Re-configuration
  - Modernize Office Furniture
- Cyclical carpet and wall coverings refresh spring 2021
- Update Occupant Emergency Plan

### **Security**

- Complete Security SharePoint site
- Complete Personnel Security Handbook
- Complete Physical Security Handbook
- Annual Review of COOP Plan (FEMA)
- Complete Facility Security Plan for Limited Area
- Develop Monthly Security Newsletter
- Complete Security SharePoint site

### **Operations & Administration**

- Develop and/or revise 20% of out-of-date directives and operating procedures
- Develop OGM Customer Service Standards
- Develop OGM and/or DOS (weekly/Bi-weekly/Mthly) Administrative Newsletter

### **Acquisitions & Procurements**

- Develop Contract Office Representative (COR) Training
- Develop and implement Acquisition training plans
- Develop and/or revise internal controls (as identified in August 2020 Grant Thornton review)
- Phase 1 & 2 of Automated Acquisition Processes

### **Human Resources**

- Achieve and maintain floor of 110 full-time equivalent employees

**IT Upgrades & Governance**

- Complete laptop rollout by December 2020
- Finalize migration from Windows 7 to Windows 10
- Migrate from Skype for Business to Microsoft Teams
- Resolve all backlogged authorizations to operate by March 2021

**Training and Employee Engagement**

- Award training and mentoring contract and initiate training classes
- Provide agency-wide training to focus on strengthening internal communications

**DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD**

**Office of the General Counsel**

**FISCAL YEAR 2021  
OGC STRATEGIC PROJECTS LIST**

**Introduction.** The Office of the General Counsel (OGC) provides direct legal support to the Board in the conduct of its oversight role. OGC supports the Technical Director and General Manager and their staff in the execution of the Board functions to provide oversight of Defense Nuclear Facilities. OGC is the repository of legal resources for the agency and manages the agency’s compliance with all legal requirements. The majority of work handled by OGC is to provide responsive legal support to the Board and the other two offices within the agency. OGC also has the lead on several important cross-cutting agency functions.

**Overview.** OGC is currently staffed with a General Counsel, an Acting Deputy General Counsel, and two staff attorneys. The office relies on contracted support to cover administrative functions within the office, including workload intake and processing, record processing, document preparation, and other administrative matters. The majority of the work OGC traditionally performs is non-discretionary, i.e., it is required by law or necessary for agency operation, or high priority, which includes direct mission work and Board-directed work. This plan does not identify the non-discretionary work planned for Fiscal Year 2021. Rather, this plan provides a list of discretionary work that OGC will spearhead to achieve organizational improvement – e.g., business process enhancements and office practices not required by law or regulation and not driven by Board direction.

**OGC Planned Discretionary Work for FY 2021**

<b>Item</b>	<b>Description</b>
Safety Allegations	Develop and implement a comprehensive Safety Allegations Program. This will include an internal Directive and Operating Procedure articulating how DNFSB will process such allegations, as well as an outward-facing resource (webpage and/or guidance document) informing the public how to report a safety allegation. Once these documents are in place, OGC will conduct appropriate training for Board Members and staff.
Sunshine Act	Develop regulations and procedures governing “nonpublic collaborative discussions” by the Board, if the Atomic Energy Act is amended to allow such discussions.
Ethics	Develop and implement an Operating Procedure on processing Board Member nominations.



**DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD**

**Office of the Technical Director**

**FISCAL YEAR 2021  
OTD WORK PLAN**

**Introduction.** The Office of the Technical Director (OTD)<sup>1</sup> developed the Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 OTD Work Plan based on the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board's (Board) strategic plan and nuclear safety oversight mission. The plan discusses the oversight approach and planning for principal reviews and other high priority work.

**Uncertainties.** Uncertainties associated with the work plan are largely tied to Department of Energy (DOE) schedule changes, emerging work activities, and the potential for technical staff attrition. Historically, DOE schedule changes tend to result in delays, which may delay oversight activities throughout the year. Board direction and emergent DOE activities also drive the need to adjust the work plan.

Additionally, due to potential uncertainties in travel and site personnel availability as a result of the on-going pandemic, OTD management encouraged oversight plan owners to consider various methods to complete the interaction phase with DOE and contractor personnel when scoping proposed reviews. Each proposed review interaction was categorized by oversight plan owners. This is discussed further in the results section.

During FY 2021, OTD leadership will adjust schedules and work activities as needed to reflect the Board's priorities and maintain the quality of each review.

**Approach.** The FY 2021 approach involved development of oversight plans and proposed review activities by oversight plan owners, with input from subject matter experts and other interested technical staff. OTD management provided direction to the technical staff based on the Board's strategic plan. Specifically, OTD management focused on Strategic Objective 1.1 – completing timely, high-quality safety reviews that identify and analyze safety issues and best practices, and search for similar challenges complex-wide. Therefore, as in prior years, OTD emphasized identification of staff reviews that have the potential to identify cross-cutting issues and support complex-wide analysis.

OTD management reviewed and approved the oversight plan strategies and reviewed the proposed review activities. From the initial set of proposed reviews, OTD management down-selected based on priority and resource constraints, and ensured each oversight plan area included appropriate coverage. All technical staff were then given the opportunity to volunteer as review leads and/or review team members for any new review activities they were interested in, and submit a prioritized list of these activities to their supervisors. OTD management finalized review team leads and members based on this staff input.

**Principal Reviews.** For FY 2021, OTD staff identified a set of potential principal reviews. Principal reviews are defined as reviews that are high priority and require significant staff resources due either to the proposed depth or breadth of the activity. The potential principal reviews are distributed across the three technical groups and include scope in operating facilities, design and construction projects, and complex-wide programs. Of these reviews, six are carryover reviews from FY20. During the course of the fiscal year, OTD management will further down-select from the list of remaining potential principal reviews to a final list, depending on DOE progress and travel restrictions. OTD management will prioritize these

---

<sup>1</sup> Acronyms are defined in Appendix B.


reviews for completion, and will provide additional management support and oversight, as needed. The list of potential principal reviews is provided in the results section.

**Engineering Performance (EP).** The work plan includes six staff activities in the EP mission area. These activities will be performed by employees across OTD. They capture OTD activities that focus on improving OTD management controls, updating procedures, and implementing staff training to achieve the Board’s mission efficiently and effectively.

**Results.** The proposed FY 2021 OTD work plan includes 64 new reviews and 55 FY 2020 carry-over reviews<sup>2</sup> turned on to start the year, including non-discretionary (ND) activities.

Figure 1 provides an estimate of resources required for the reviews by OTD group, and Figure 2 shows a breakdown by site. Table 1 provides the complete list of potential principal reviews, and Table 2 discusses the breakdown of reviews by interaction type. The next three sections provide the planned reviews for each OTD group, organized by site and/or oversight plan area.


**Figure 1.** *Work Plan Resource Loading by Technical Group*



---

<sup>2</sup> Carry-over reviews are reviews that were started in FY20 for which some level of effort will continue into FY21.

**Figure 2. Work Plan Resource Loading by Site<sup>3</sup>**



<sup>3</sup> DOE HQ reviews are reviews that include interactions primarily with DOE HQ staff, and the majority of these reviews are DOE Directives reviews.

Complex-wide reviews are reviews which include interactions at the majority of DOE sites, and/or focus on implementation of a particular area across the complex (e.g., Management of Aging Infrastructure).

Multiple site reviews are reviews which include interactions at two or three DOE sites (e.g., Safety Management Programs Review at Y-12 and Pantex).

**Table 1. Potential Principal Reviews**

<b>Group</b>	<b>Review Title</b>	<b>Site</b>	<b>FY20 Carryover</b>
NWP	LANL Adequacy of Safety SSCs	LANL	Yes
NPA	Assessment of DOE Oversight Effectiveness	Complex Wide	Yes
NPA	Draft DOE Standard 5506, <i>Preparation of Safety Basis Documents for Transuranic Waste Facilities</i>	DOE HQ	Yes
NPA	DOE Handbook 3010-94, <i>Airborne Release Fractions/Rates and Respirable Fractions for Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities</i>	DOE HQ	Yes
NPA	Safety Management Programs Review at Y-12 and Pantex	Multiple Sites	Yes
NPA	Management of Aging Infrastructure	Complex Wide	No
NPA	Quality of Field Office Review and Approval of Documented Safety Analyses	Complex Wide	No
NMPS	WTP-DFLAW Integration of Safety Bases Review	Hanford	Yes
NMPS	WTP-HLW Preliminary Design Review	Hanford	No

**Table 2. Review Activities by Interaction Type**

<b>Interaction Type</b>	<b># of Review Activities</b>
On-site essential	39
On-site preferred	27
Remote	47
N/A	6

“On-site essential” review activities indicate that at least part of the interaction phase of the review (e.g., on-site discussions, walkdowns, or field observations) will be required to occur on-site to complete the review activity. “On-site preferred” indicates the preference of the staff to complete all or part of the interaction phase on-site; however, if there are travel restrictions, the staff will be able to complete the entire review activity remotely, using teleconferences. Review activities with a “remote” interaction type represent reviews that, even in a typical year with no travel restrictions, the staff would complete remotely, with interactions held via teleconference if necessary. Finally, the six review activities marked “N/A” represent EP activities that are internal activities requiring no interaction with DOE or contractor personnel.

## Nuclear Weapon Programs (NWP).

OTD's NWP group performs independent and timely oversight of the safety of operations involving maintenance of the nuclear weapons stockpile and of weapons-related research, development, and testing. NWP also conducts safety oversight of National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) design and construction projects in accordance with the Board's Policy Statement-6 (PS-6). In FY 2021, NWP will conduct effective safety oversight through formal, well-planned reviews at NNSA defense nuclear facilities. In the course of these activities, NWP will assist the Board in notifying NNSA of potential safety items at NNSA defense nuclear facilities and in nuclear explosive operations, while maintaining a near-continuous oversight presence at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12), and the Pantex Plant. Tables 3 through 9 identify all NWP reviews turned on in the work plan (principal reviews shown in bold).

**Table 3. LANL Reviews**

Priority	Review Title	FY20 Carryover
<b>1</b>	<b>LANL Adequacy of Safety SSCs</b>	<b>Yes</b>
2	PF-4 Leak Path Factor Upgrade Supporting Calculations Review	Yes
2	PF-4 Seismic Performance Assessment	No
2	Aqueous Nitrate Restart Activities	No
2	Conduct of Operations and Training	No
2	PF-4 Updated Atmospheric Dispersion Analysis Review	No
2	Glovebox Glove Integrity Program	No
3	Onsite Transportation Safety	No
3	RLUOB Safety Basis	Yes

**Table 4. LLNL Reviews**

Priority	Review Title	FY20 Carryover
2	LLNL Building 332 Seismic Safety Review	Yes
2	LLNL Recovery Glovebox Line - Building 332 DSA/TSR Review	No

**Table 5. NNSC Reviews**

Priority	Review Title	FY20 Carryover
ND	ECSE PDSA Review	No
2	DAF SSI Analysis Review	Yes
2	LANL NCERC Operations Criticality Safety Program Review	Yes
2	DAF & NCERC Safety Basis Review	No

3	RWMC Safety Basis Review	Yes
---	--------------------------	-----

**Table 6. Pantex Reviews**

Priority	Review Title	FY20 Carryover
ND	Evaluation of Recommendation 2019-1 Implementation Plan Deliverables	Yes
ND	Pantex Concerns Review	Yes
1	Evaluation of Pantex Planned Improvements	Yes
2	Electrical Tester Equipment Review	Yes
2	Fire Protection Program Review	Yes
2	Known State Operations Startup	No
2	Controls for Natural Phenomena Hazard Events	No
3	W78 Operational Safety Review	Yes
3	Welding Program Review	No
3	W87 Operational Safety Review	No
3	W76 Operational Safety Review	No
3	W80 Operational Safety Review	No

**Table 7. SNL Reviews**

Priority	Review Title	FY20 Carryover
1	Review of EP&R at SNL	Yes
3	SNL Weapon Response Technical Basis Review	Yes
3	Conduct of Operations Review at ACRR	No

**Table 8. SRS-NNSA**

Priority	Review Title	FY20 Carryover
ND	Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility CD-1 Review	Yes
ND	Tritium Finishing Facility CD-1 Review	Yes
3	SRS Tritium Safety Management Programs	No
3	SRS' Corrective Actions on Sub-Rec 3 of Recommendation 2019-2	No
4	SRS Tritium Facilities Electrical Systems Review	Yes
4	SRS Tritium Stack Analysis	No

**Table 9. Y-12 Reviews**

<b>Priority</b>	<b>Review Title</b>	<b>FY20 Carryover</b>
1	Y-12 Fire Protection Programmatic Review	No
2	Review of Y-12 Facilities with Enduring Missions	Yes
2	Y-12 Criticality Safety Program Follow-up Review	Yes
2	Conduct of Maintenance Review	No
3	UPF Equipment Procurement and Installation Review	Yes
3	Building 9215 DSA Review	No
3	Out-of-Service Equipment Holdup Review	Yes
3	UPF Factory Acceptance Testing	No
3	Safety Basis Implementation Review	No



**Nuclear Materials Processing and Stabilization (NMPS).**

The NMPS group performs independent and timely oversight ensuring that the health and safety of the public are adequately protected as DOE disposes of excess radioactive materials, cleans up surplus defense nuclear facilities, and begins operation of new facilities. NMPS also conducts safety oversight of Environmental Management (DOE-EM) design and construction projects in accordance with PS-6.

NMPS will conduct effective safety oversight through formal, well-planned safety reviews at DOE-EM defense nuclear facilities. In the course of these activities, NMPS will assist the Board in notifying DOE of potential safety items at DOE defense nuclear facilities, while maintaining a near-continuous oversight presence at Savannah River Site (SRS) and the Hanford Site. Tables 10 through 16 identify NMPS reviews turned on in the work plan (principal reviews shown in bold).

**Table 10. Hanford Reviews**

Priority	Review Title	FY20 Carryover
2	WTP Safety Management Programs	Yes
<b>2</b>	<b>WTP-DFLAW Integration of Safety Bases Review</b>	<b>Yes</b>
2	Building 324 Remediation (Radiological Control – Conduct of Operations)	Yes
<b>2</b>	<b>WTP-HLW Preliminary Design Review</b>	<b>No</b>
2	SWOC/CWC DSA Review	Yes
3	Tank and Pipeline Integrity	No
3	CWC Hazard Controls	Yes

**Table 11. INL Reviews**

Priority	Review Title	FY20 Carryover
3	IWTU DOE Readiness Assessment Prior to Confirmatory Run	No
3	ARP/AMWTP TRU Waste Characterization, Storage, and Handling Operations	No
4	Calcine Retrieval Project	No

**Table 12. LANL-EM Reviews**

Priority	Review Title	FY20 Carryover
3	Area G Safety Basis	No

**Table 13. ORNL Reviews**

Priority	Review Title	FY20 Carryover
2	SWSA-5 PDSA Review	No
2	SWSA-5 Readiness Activities Review	No
3	Building 2026 Readiness Activities Review	No

**Table 14. SRS Reviews**

Priority	Review Title	FY20 Carryover
ND	SRS Public Hearing	Yes
ND	Building 235-F Revised Implementation Plan Review	Yes
1	H-Canyon DSA/TSR Rev 14 Review	Yes
2	H-Canyon Exhaust Tunnel Structural Analysis	Yes
3	DOE-STD-3013 Surveillance and Monitoring Program Annual Review	No
3	Surplus Pu Disposition Conceptual Design Review	No
3	SWPF Sustained Operations	No
3	K-Area Safety Basis Review, DSA Rev 16	No
3	SRNL Safety Basis Implementation	No

**Table 15. WIPP Reviews**

Priority	Review Title	FY20 Carryover
3	WIPP SSCVS Procurement/Construction Review	No
3	WCS Waste Disposition	Yes
3	700C Fan Startup Review	No
4	Safety Instrumented Alarm System Failure Review	Yes
4	WIPP UG Air Flow Direction	Yes
4	FY2021 National TRU Program Users Group Meeting	No
4	CBFO Certification of LANL Nitric Acid/Cheesecloth Waste	Yes

**Table 16. Multiple NMPS Sites Reviews**

Priority	Review Title	FY20 Carryover
3	DOE-EM Design and Construction Projects Baseline Review	No
4	NTP Certified Program Oversight	No

## Nuclear Programs and Analysis (NPA)

The NPA group performs independent and timely oversight of the development, implementation, and maintenance of DOE regulations, requirements, and guidance for providing adequate protection of public health and safety at defense nuclear facilities, and the establishment and implementation of safety programs at defense nuclear facilities.

NPA is responsible for complex-wide programmatic review efforts addressing topics such as nuclear criticality safety, facility aging management, DOE oversight, and emergency management. Several planned NPA activities will interface with and provide input to site-specific reviews contained in the NWP and NMPS oversight plans. NPA also leads OTD review of DOE directives. Tables 17 through 20 identify NPA reviews turned on in the work plan (principal reviews shown in bold), as well as the EP activities for FY2021.

**Table 17. Directives Reviews**

Priority	Review Title	FY20 Carryover
ND	MOU Development Support	No
<b>1</b>	<b>Draft DOE Standard 5506, Preparation of Safety Basis Documents for Transuranic (TRU) Waste Facilities</b>	<b>Yes</b>
1	DOE Guide 424.1-1B, <i>Implementation Guide for Use in Addressing USQ Requirements</i>	No
1	DOE-HDBK-1224, <i>Hazard and Accident Analysis Handbook</i>	No
1	Recommendation 2020-1 response follow-up	Yes
<b>2</b>	<b>DOE Handbook 3010-94, Airborne Release Fractions/Rates and Respirable Fractions for Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities</b>	<b>Yes</b>
2	DOE Standard 1228-2019, <i>Preparation of Documented Safety Analysis for Hazard Category 3 DOE Nuclear Facilities</i>	Yes
2	DOE Standard 1027-2018, <i>Hazard Categorization of DOE Nuclear Facilities</i>	Yes
2	DOE Order 425.1D, <i>Verification of Readiness to Startup or Restart Nuclear Facilities</i>	No
2	DOE-STD-1020, <i>Natural Phenomena Hazards Analysis and Design Criteria for DOE Facilities</i>	No
2	DOE-STD-1066, <i>Fire Protection</i>	No
3	Draft DOE-STD-1195, <i>Design of SS SIS Used at DOE Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities</i>	Yes
3	DOE-HDBK-1169-YR & DOE-STD-1269-YR, <i>Air Cleaning Systems in DOE Nuclear Facilities</i>	Yes

**Table 18. Safety Management Program Reviews**

Priority	Review Title	FY20 Carryover
ND	<b>Assessment of DOE Oversight Effectiveness</b>	Yes
ND	Maintenance and Reliability of Safety-Related SSCs	Yes
1	Complex-wide Criticality Safety Evaluation	Yes
<b>1</b>	<b>Quality of Field Office review and approval of DSAs</b>	<b>No</b>
<b>1</b>	<b>SMP reviews at Y-12 and Pantex</b>	<b>Yes</b>
1	Emergency Exercise Observations	No
1	DOE Corporate Operating Experience Program Implementation	No
1	DOE COVID-19 Response	Yes
2	Staff Analysis of DOE Criticality Safety Annual Metrics	No
3	Review of EP&R and Assurance at major DNFs (Hanford)	Yes
3	Pantex Dosimetry	No

**Table 19. Nuclear Safety Topical Studies Reviews**

Priority	Review Title	FY20 Carryover
<b>1</b>	<b>Management of Aging Infrastructure</b>	<b>No</b>
2	Implementation of Defense-In-Depth	Yes
2	Reactive Nuclear Materials	Yes
2	Dispersion Modeling	Yes
2	Status of PSHAs cited in DSAs	Yes
3	Confinement Approaches for HC-2 Facilities	No
3	Review of DOE's Safety Software Registry	No
3	Categorization of HC-3 and Below HC-3 Facilities	No
3	Qualification of batteries used in SS/SC systems	No
4	Maintenance of Underground Cabling	Yes
6	Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation	Yes

**Table 20. EP Activities**

Priority	Review Title	FY20 Carryover
EP	OTD Procedures	No
EP	Technical Staff Training	No
EP	Internal Control Assessments	No
EP	External Interface	No
EP	OTD Work Plan and Reports	No
EP	Recruiting and Performance Reports	No

## Appendix A. Acronyms

Acronym	Full Name
AMWTP	Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project (INL)
ACRR	Annular Core Research Reactor (SNL)
ARP	Accelerated Retrieval Project (INL)
CBFO	Carlsbad Field Office
CD	Critical Decision
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CWC	Central Waste Complex
DAF	Device Assembly Facility (NNSS)
DFLAW	Direct Feed to LAW (Hanford)
DNF	Defense Nuclear Facility
DOE	Department of Energy
DOE-EM	DOE Environmental Management
DOE-HQ	DOE Headquarters
DSA	Documented Safety Analysis
DWPF	Defense Waste Processing Facility (SRS)
ECSE	Enhanced Capabilities for Subcritical Experiments (NNSS)
EP	Engineering Performance
EP&R	Emergency Planning and Response
FY	Fiscal Year
GSTR	Generator Site Technical Review
HC	Hazard Category
HDBK	Handbook
HEPA	High Efficiency Particulate Air
HEUMF	Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility (Y-12)
HLW	High Level Waste
HPFL	High Pressure Fire Loop
INL	Idaho National Laboratory
IP	Implementation Plan
IWTU	Integrated Waste Treatment Unit (INL)
LANL	Los Alamos National Laboratory
LAW	Low Activity Waste
LLNL	Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
NCERC	National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NNSS)
ND	Non-discretionary
NMPS	Nuclear Materials Processing and Stabilization
NNSA	National Nuclear Security Administration

<b>Acronym</b>	<b>Full Name</b>
NNSS	Nevada National Security Site
NPA	Nuclear Programs and Analysis
NTP	National Transuranic Waste Program
NWP	Nuclear Weapon Programs
ORNL	Oak Ridge National Laboratory
ORR	Operational Readiness Review
OTD	Office of the Technical Director
Pantex	Pantex Plant
PDSA	Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis
PF-4	Plutonium Facility (LANL)
PS-6	Policy Statement 6
PSHA	Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis
RLUOB	Radiological Laboratory Utility Office Building (LANL)
RWMC	Radioactive Waste Management Complex (NNSS)
SC	Safety Class
SMP	Safety Management Program
SNL	Sandia National Laboratory
SRNL	Savannah River National Laboratory
SRPPF	Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility
SRS	Savannah River Site
SS	Safety Significant
SSC	Structures, systems, and components
SSCVS	Safety Significant Confinement Ventilation System (WIPP)
SSI	Soil Structure Interaction
STD	Standard
SWOC	Solid Waste Operations Complex (Hanford)
SWPF	Salt Waste Processing Facility (SRS)
SWSA	Solid Waste Storage Area (ORNL)
TAPI	Tank and Pipeline Integrity
TEF	Tritium Extraction Facility (SRS)
TRU	Transuranic
TSR	Technical Safety Requirement
TWF	Transuranic Waste Facility (LANL)
UPF	Uranium Processing Facility (Y-12)
USQ	Unreviewed Safety Question
WCS	Waste Control Specialists (Andrews, Texas)
WESF	Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility (Hanford)
WIPP	Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

<b>Acronym</b>	<b>Full Name</b>
WTP	Waste Treatment & Immobilization Plant (Hanford)
Y-12	Y-12 National Security Complex

**AFFIRMATION OF BOARD VOTING RECORD**

**SUBJECT:**

**Doc Control#:** 2020-300-0035

The Board acted on the above document on 10/01/2020. The document was Approved.

The votes were recorded as:

	APRVD	DISAPRVD	ABSTAIN	NOT PARTICIPATING	COMMENT	DATE
Thomas Summers	✓	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	10/01/2020
Jessie H. Roberson	✓	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	10/01/2020
Joyce L. Connery	✓	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	10/01/2020

This Record contains a summary of voting on this matter together with the individual vote sheets, views and comments of the Board Members.

*Shelby Qualls*

Executive Secretary to the Board

Attachments:

1. Voting Summary
2. Board Member Vote Sheets



**DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD**

**NOTATIONAL VOTE RESPONSE SHEET**

**FROM:** Thomas Summers

**SUBJECT:**

**Doc Control#:** 2020-300-0035

**DATE:** 10/23/2020

**VOTE:** Approved

**Member voted by email.**

**COMMENTS:**

None

*Thomas Summers*

**DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD**  
**NOTATIONAL VOTE RESPONSE SHEET**

**FROM:** Jessie H. Roberson

**SUBJECT:**

**Doc Control#:** 2020-300-0035

**DATE:** 10/23/2020

**VOTE:** Approved

**Member voted by email.**

**COMMENTS:**

None

*Jessie H. Roberson*

**DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD**  
**NOTATIONAL VOTE RESPONSE SHEET**

**FROM:** Joyce L. Connery

**SUBJECT:**

**Doc Control#:** 2020-300-0035

**DATE:** 10/23/2020

**VOTE:** Approved

**Member voted by email.**

**COMMENTS:**

None

*Joyce L. Connery*