

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

October 9, 2020

**TO:** Christopher J. Roscetti, Technical Director  
**FROM:** M. Bradisse, B. Caleca and P. Fox, Hanford Resident Inspectors  
**SUBJECT:** Hanford Activity Report for the Week Ending October 9, 2020

**Central Plateau Risk Management (CPRM):** Contractor management declared readiness to stabilize three underground structures that are at an elevated risk of collapse (see 10/2/2020 report). They expect to complete these activities by the end of the calendar year.

The Resident Inspector observed an incident command post (ICP) limited drill conducted for the 224-B facility near B-Plant. The Building Emergency Director (BED) was being evaluated for initial proficiency at this facility. Shortly before the drill was scheduled to begin, the building in which it was to take place was temporarily closed for COVID-19 cleaning. After reconstituting the shift office functions in building 2740W in 200-West Area, the drill activity proceeded. The BED was recommended for proficiency. However, during the hotwash, drill controllers noted difficulties related to event classification, and identified potential opportunities for improvement related to the layout of written materials used in classification activities.

**Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP):** Following routine housekeeping activities, a radiological control supervisor noted that air samples required by the activity's radiation work permit (RWP) had not been taken. Prior to changes in the PFP work control area spurred by COVID-19, real-time air sampling was available to support general work activities. However, with many of these samplers not in use, the RWP was modified to require job-specific air sampling for many work activities. During the In Progress ALARA review, the field work supervisor (FWS) noted that the RWP, which is used for routine work, was not reviewed in detail during the pre-job meeting.

**Waste Treatment Plant (WTP):** WTP management submitted revision 2 of their plan of action (POA) for a contractor operational readiness review (CORR) to DOE for approval. The revision updates the POA to reflect DOE's recent approval of a revised documented safety analysis (DSA) that complies with DOE STD 1228-2019, *Preparation of Documented Safety Analysis for Hazard Category 3 DOE Nuclear Facilities*. The revised POA also includes additional details related to non-CORR activities that they will credit for the accomplishment of readiness review core requirements. In particular, they intend to credit results from their independent Cold Commissioning Management Assessment and their Integrated Safety Management System Phase II verification. They also indicated that they may use results from additional independent reviews conducted prior to the CORR including a planned emergency preparedness exercise, a work control assessment, and a DSA independent verification review.

**Tank Farms:** The Tank Farm Operations Contractor (TOC) is performing a common cause analysis to determine potential actions to reduce the frequency of unplanned ventilation shutdowns across TOC facilities, including tank exhaust systems. Their initial screening indicated that many of the shutdowns can be primarily attributed to personnel who do not understand how the system will react or do not fully understand the facility's configuration prior to changing conditions. The TOC has implemented compensatory measures pending the identification and completion of actions to reduce system shutdown frequency.