

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

August 28, 2020

**TO:** Christopher J. Roscetti, Technical Director  
**FROM:** M. Bradisse, B. Caleca and P. Fox, Hanford Resident Inspectors  
**SUBJECT:** Hanford Activity Report for the Week Ending August 28, 2020

**Hanford Site:** DOE EM-1 approved the Hanford Site Manager's request to transition the site's operational posture to Phase 2 of their COVID-19 work resumption/remobilization plan. The existing partial stop work actions (see 3/20/2020 and 4/24/2020 reports) have been modified to support the transition, which will occur on August 31. The transition will allow DOE and its contractors to resume additional onsite work activities and return additional workers to the site.

DOE's transition from the existing Plateau Remediation Contract to the new Central Plateau Cleanup Contract (CPCC) (see 12/13/2019 report) has been delayed because of the ongoing response to COVID-19, as well as contract protests that have since been resolved (see 5/1/2020 report). This week, DOE extended the current contract through March 31, 2021 to support ongoing operations until they can transition those operations to the CPCC.

**Solid Waste Operations Complex:** After loading a TL-1800 shipping container holding transuranic (TRU) waste onto a flatbed trailer, an operator backed their forklift into a second TL-1800 shipping container holding TRU waste from the Plutonium Finishing Plant. The waste is double contained and, although the impact did move the container, it caused only minor damage to the container wall which forms the outer barrier of the waste package. In response to the event, the facility conservatively entered the appropriate emergency response procedure and isolated the building by closing all doors and securing ventilation. They also entered the limiting condition for operation for container integrity, which will require an evaluation of the container under the abnormal container management program to identify any need for further action. A building re-entry team determined there was no release of radiological or chemical contamination. Facility management has scheduled a critique to collect facts related to the event.

**Tank Farms:** The contractor's plant review committee (PRC) met to discuss a proposed change to the tank farms documented safety analysis and technical safety requirements supporting the addition of the Tank Side Cesium Removal system (TSCR) (see 12/20/2019 report). This change introduces facility modes (for TSCR only) as well as several engineered and administrative controls. Most, but not all, of the new content is intended to protect the facility worker from potential flammable gas explosions in the ion exchange column or ancillary equipment, either by preventing the accident or mitigating the effects. The PRC recommended approval of the package with comments.

The contractor held a mockup to demonstrate a new glove bag configuration and techniques that they will use to perform grab sampling of single shell tank AX-102. These modifications are intended to address past contamination events (see 1/10/2020 report). This includes additional drapes inside the glove bag, rinsing the top hat prior to grab sampling, and improved glove bag housekeeping processes. Contractor personnel demonstrated good knowledge of procedures and response to abnormal conditions, though there was general agreement that further work was required to determine the best practice for down posting a riser after work was completed.