

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

March 20, 2020

**TO:** Christopher J. Roscetti, Technical Director  
**FROM:** Matthew Duncan and Brandon Weathers, Resident Inspectors  
**SUBJECT:** Oak Ridge Activity Report for Week Ending March 20, 2020

**COVID-19:** Federal and contractor employees have been implementing basic preventive measures and protective actions for COVID-19. Contingency planning continued as the situation continues to evolve. CNS continued normal operations at the Y-12 National Security Complex. North Wind Solutions continued normal operations at the Transuranic Waste Processing Center. Isotek Systems, LLC (Isotek) recently completed processing the eighth canister for the Oak Ridge Oxide Processing Campaign (see 9/27/19 report). Isotek decided to wait to start processing the next canister pending further developments. Isotek plans to continue construction activities associated with the Initial Processing Campaign (see 6/28/19 report).

**Conduct of Operations:** CNS personnel performed calibrations on a pressure switch and pressure transmitters for annual technical safety requirement surveillances without having the required, continuous use metrology procedures present during the calibration activities. The calibrators asked if a procedure was needed before they began work, but were told no. Since the maintenance work package instructions did not clearly cite the required procedure, this contributed to the assumption that a procedure was not required. The mistake was identified prior to returning the equipment to service. The affected equipment was placed on hold until the calibrations were re-performed. Other corrective actions assigned during the fact finding were to revise the maintenance plans to specifically cite the calibration procedures and review other calibration work packages to ensure that applicable procedures are cited.

**Building 9212:** CNS began executing a plan to resume operations that were paused in a portion of Building 9212 as a result of nuclear criticality safety violations (see 3/6/20 report). The first phase of the plan establishes multi-disciplined work teams that will conduct reviews of work activities performed in the area. These reviews are intended to include corrections, improvements, and walk-throughs of those processes, procedures, and postings. The second phase is daily oversight of operations by personnel from the readiness assurance group and operations subject matter experts. The focus of this phase is to confirm the ability to execute disciplined operations. This oversight will focus on procedure adherence, compliance with requirements, and coaching personnel. The daily oversight in phase two will continue until the Production Operations Senior Director determines that the exit criteria have been met.

**Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility:** The facility experienced a short loss of smoke detection capability when an air handling unit tripped off due to a fault in a motor bearing. The facility performed the required actions and has restored smoke detection capability.

**Emergency Management:** Typically, exercises end as a reentry plan is being developed or has been completed, but not executed. Last week, CNS conducted an emergency exercise that began at the point where an exercise last December had ended. The scenario involved a simulated security event and chemical release (see 1/24/20 report). This gave Y-12 personnel an opportunity to demonstrate reentry for the first time during an exercise.