

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

December 13, 2019

**TO:** Christopher J. Roscetti, Technical Director  
**FROM:** M. T. Sautman and Z. C. McCabe Resident Inspectors  
**SUBJECT:** Savannah River Site Activity Report for Week Ending December 13, 2019

**Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF):** DOE returned the Readiness to Proceed letter to Parsons without acceptance and for additional action. DOE noted that the contractor Operational Readiness Review (ORR) final report identified four key programs that had not yet been developed and implemented (Radiation Protection, Work Planning and Control, Fire Protection, and Emergency Preparedness) and weaknesses in the Integrated Safety Management System which must be address prior to the Declaration of Readiness for the DOE ORR. DOE directed Parsons to submit and execute a comprehensive Corrective Action Plan (CAP), including schedules and effectiveness reviews. In addition, DOE stated that the CAP must also provide sufficient time for DOE to assess the effectiveness and closure of the CAP actions. Parsons subsequently replied stating that they disagreed with DOE's conclusions and that they stand by their Declaration of Readiness. Parsons and DOE agreed to meet next week to develop a list of issues to address prior to the DOE ORR.

**Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF):** When completing a temporary modification to supply lighting during a load center outage DWPF personnel re-energized a fan and heater that was supposed to be part of a lockout. The temporary modification involved moving a lighting panel from the load center that would be de-energized to another. The lockout order referenced four temporary modifications including the one to supply temporary lighting; however, it did not recognize the fact that the aforementioned fan and heater were also supplied from the same panel. Prior to the lockout being determined, DWPF had begun installing the temporary modification and identified that the main breaker on the panel had broken. Before the breaker was replaced, DWPF personnel successfully determined the lockout with the fan and the heater on the panel de-energized due to the broken breaker. Approximately two days later DWPF personnel successfully replaced the main breaker. Prior to energizing the lighting panel DWPF personnel reviewed the panel schedule to ensure they understood what would be energized, but the panel schedule incorrectly listed the fan and heater as supplied by "LC 82" (which does not exist in DWPF) instead of "LC B2." Shortly thereafter, the shift manager was informed that the fan and heater had been energized which constituted a lockout violation. As one of several corrective actions, DWPF personnel are going to revise the lockout to include the two breakers on the panel for the heater and fan and then determine the entire lockout again. Additionally, DWPF personnel will be performing an apparent causal analysis to better define the cause and any additional corrective actions.

**H-Canyon:** H-Canyon personnel completed a Technical Surveillance Requirement surveillance using a procedure that was missing a page and had an expired temporary procedure change. The missing page (an attachment) included the acceptance criteria for several surveillance requirements, but this information is duplicated in other parts of the procedure. Further, this attachment is not referenced except in the precautions and limitations section that only acknowledges that it exists. The expired temporary change was also inconsequential. H-Canyon personnel are investigating these errors to prevent reoccurrence.